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Career Concerns and the Nature of Skills†
By Gonzalo Cisternas*
I examine how career concerns are shaped by the nature of produc-
tive actions taken by workers. A worker’s skills follow a Gaussian 
process with an endogenous component reflecting  human-capital 
accumulation. Effort and skills are substitutes both in the output pro-
cess (as in Holmström 1999) and in the skills technology. The focus 
is on deterministic equilibria by virtue of Gaussian learning. When 
effort and skills are direct inputs to production and skills are exoge-
nous, effort can be inefficiently high in the beginning of a career. In 
contrast, when skills are the only input to production but accumulate 
through past effort choices, the worker always underinvests in skill 
acquisition. At the center of the discrepancy are two types of ex post 
errors that arise at interpreting output due to an identification prob-
lem faced by the market. Finally, the robustness of the underin-
vestment result is explored via variations in the  skill-accumulation 
technology and in the information structure, and policy implications 
are discussed. (JEL D83, I26, J24, J31)
A common force driving many productive decisions by workers is the possibility of being perceived as skilled in a certain area of expertise. While such career 
concerns are a defining feature of many occupations, new technologies that facilitate 
the flow of information about potential employees, as well as online marketplaces 
that enable matches between firms and workers, naturally lead these motives to play 
an even more predominant role nowadays. Studying how markets reward ability is 
a relevant topic for two reasons. First, it helps to uncover the mechanisms through 
which workers can build their reputations in labor markets. Second, it helps to eval-
uate whether  market-based incentives induce appropriate productive decisions by 
workers, thereby contributing to the discussion of economic policy.
In traditional models of career concerns (e.g., Holmström 1999; Dewatripont, 
Jewitt, and Tirole 1999; and Bonatti and Hörner 2017), reputation is understood 
as a market’s belief concerning a worker’s unobserved measure of productive abil-
ity modeled as an exogenous type (e.g., “talent,” either fixed or stochastically 
evolving over time); the worker’s action (e.g., “effort”) is in turn a direct input to 
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production. In many industries, however, workers become more skilled on the job: 
for example, scientists write better papers as a consequence of doing research; 
surgeons become more skilled through performing surgeries; and lawyers acquire 
more experience through repeated litigation. In all of these occupations, workers’ 
productive actions can have persistent effects on output via the accumulation of 
human capital.
The systematic analysis of human capital began with the seminal work of Becker 
(1962, 1975). Despite the importance of this theory in explaining properties of the 
distribution of earnings ( Ben-Porath 1967, Rosen 1976) and its implications for 
economic growth (Lucas 1988; Mankiw, Romer, and Weil 1992), little attention 
has been devoted to the determinants of  on-the-job skill acquisition in settings 
where workers behave strategically, such as when they have reputational concerns. 
Industries such as those previously mentioned are critical components of many 
developed economies, and a significant amount of skill development takes place on 
such jobs. Understanding the forces behind reputationally driven skill acquisition 
is thus of  first-order importance, as human capital is arguably the main source of 
economic growth in modern times (Goldin and Katz 2008).
Main Contribution.—This paper contributes to the understanding of incentives in 
such labor markets by developing a flexible model of career concerns with strategic 
skill acquisition. The model nests the cases of exogenous productivity studied in 
Holmström (1999) as special instances within a larger class of Gaussian processes 
for skills that allow for endogenous trends reflecting  learning-by-doing. The main 
finding relates to how the inability of markets to directly observe workers’ produc-
tivities interplays with workers’ incentives depending on the nature of their produc-
tive actions (i.e., effort as a direct input to production versus an input to skills), and 
thus, on the nature of skills (i.e., exogenous versus endogenous). Specifically, while 
the inability to observe productivities can generate strong incentives by allowing 
the output consequences of productive actions of  short-term nature to be overrep-
resented in wages, it can also severely damage workers’ incentives by preventing 
actions that enhance productivity—and thus have a  long-term impact on output—to 
be fully priced into wages.
To illustrate the previous finding, Sections I and II analyze a particular specifica-
tion of this model: the worker’s hidden actions can simultaneously affect current out-
put and the rate of change of skills. At one extreme, there is a pure  career-concerns 
model: effort is a direct input to production, and skills evolve exogenously. This 
model fits situations in which a measure of innate ability is a critical component 
of the production process (e.g., managerial talent). At the other extreme, there is 
a pure  human-capital model: effort affects skills directly, and the latter is the only 
input to production. This model captures environments in which current effort can 
have persistent effects on future output through skill acquisition (e.g., experience 
in litigation). Actions and skills enter additively separably in the output and skill 
technologies, which renders learning to be Gaussian. Normally distributed beliefs 
and linear payoffs, in turn, enable the analysis to focus on deterministic equilibria 
in which actions depend only on calendar time, as the latter maps  one-to-one to the 
contemporaneous degree of uncertainty about skills.
154 AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL: MICROECONOMICS MAY 2018
In this baseline model, output is public, and hence the labor market learns about 
the worker’s skills using the entire time series of realized production. Moreover, 
competition forces wages to reflect the market’s expectation of  next-period output at 
all times, so the wage paid is an affine function of the market belief about the work-
er’s skills. Crucially, the market updates its belief upward (downward) if realized 
output is above (below) the market’s expectation. Thus, wages are revised based on 
the observations of output surprises.
To understand how the worker’s incentives interact with learning depending on 
the nature of his skills, suppose that the market conjectures that the worker follows 
a deterministic strategy. Upon observing an output surprise, therefore, the market 
faces an identification problem: how much of the unanticipated output observed 
is due to a change in skills versus noise in the output signal? This informational 
limitation leads the market to make two types of ex post errors: first, to incorrectly 
attach a positive probability that an output surprise driven by noise was instead due 
to a change in skills; second, if the signal observed was driven by a change in skills, 
Bayesian learning attaches a  nonzero probability that it was due to noise.
In a pure  career-concerns setting, effort choices—like noise—influence only cur-
rent output. Upon observing an output surprise due to an increase in effort, the 
market attaches a positive probability to such surprise being triggered by a shock to 
skills, and skills have persistence. Therefore, due to learning, effort has a persistent 
effect on wages despite its only transitory effect on output. In contrast, in a pure 
 human-capital setting, effort has a persistent effect on output, just as shocks to skills 
do. However, the identification problem leads the market to always attach a positive 
probability to noise being the driver of the additional output that results from effort 
choices. Learning thus leads effort to having an effect on wages that is weaker than 
the corresponding impact on output.
This dual way in which the identification problem operates can have  nontrivial 
implications. Specifically, when actions have direct, yet  short-term effects on output, 
and skills are sufficiently autocorrelated and the initial prior sufficiently dispersed, 
effort is inefficiently high in the beginning of a career; in such cases, beliefs are 
overly responsive to output surprises, leading effort to have an excessively strong 
effect on wages. In contrast, when actions have delayed, yet  long-lived effects on 
output via skill acquisition, effort is inefficiently low throughout a worker’s entire 
career, regardless of the degree of autocorrelation in skills and initial uncertainty. 
Thus, there is underinvestment in skill acquisition.
Dynamics.—Regarding the dynamics of incentives, effort choices always decay 
over time, regardless of the nature of the worker’s skills. This unifying result is 
important for two reasons. First, it confirms that the intuition that the returns to 
reputation formation can decay over a worker’s career purely due to informational 
considerations is likely to be a more robust phenomenon. Second, it sheds light 
on the mechanism that drives this intuition. Specifically, while beliefs become less 
sensitive to output surprises as learning progresses (an effect that dampens incen-
tives), they also acquire more persistence (which strengthens incentives). The fact 
that the first effect dominates the second simply reflects that the total responsiveness 
of beliefs over long horizons decays as learning progresses.
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In the long run, effort always settles below efficiency due to the combination of 
impatience and beliefs responding too little to new information; larger degrees of 
skill autocorrelation nevertheless alleviate this inefficiency by increasing the overall 
responsiveness of beliefs. Interestingly, as the persistence of skills approximates the 
discount rate, incentives in pure  career-concerns environments become arbitrarily 
close to efficiency. In fact, the additional persistence of the market’s belief that 
results from higher levels of autocorrelation asymptotically offsets the worker’s rate 
of impatience, leading the sensitivity and persistence of wages to approximately bal-
ance each other; but the ratio of the latter fully characterizes incentives when pay-
offs and learning are linear. The comparative static shows, however, that attaining 
efficiency requires the worker’s utility to become arbitrarily large in absolute value.
Robustness.—The existence of deterministic equilibria relies on the linearity of 
payoffs and the substitutability between effort and skills: if either one is relaxed, the 
myopic return from affecting output will depend on the worker’s reputation, leading 
to equilibrium actions that will also depend on past performance.1 Critically, how-
ever, both the identification problem and the way in which it hurts incentives in pure 
 human-capital settings will not disappear.
It is then natural to explore more general  skill-accumulation technologies under 
the umbrella of the previous assumptions. In this line, Section III characterizes 
deterministic equilibria via a certainty equivalent: provided the  skill-accumulation 
technology is deterministic (i.e., the endogenous component of skills is a general 
function of past effort choices exclusively), equilibria of this sort correspond to 
solutions to a decision problem with certainty.
The certainty equivalent shows that the equilibrium and socially efficient invest-
ment policies found in the baseline model are, more generally, measures of the rep-
utational and social value of a transitory increase in human capital. While these 
reputational and social measures of the value of human capital are only of local 
nature, their uniform ranking suggests that workers will always underinvest in skills. 
I confirm this intuition for the case of linear technologies; i.e., the rate of growth in 
skills is a linear function of past effort choices.
Information Structures and Policy.—The previous results offer insights on the 
role that incomplete information and imperfect monitoring, via learning, can have 
on  labor-market outcomes, and thus have the potential to guide economic policy. 
Wage subsidies and better monitoring technologies, for instance, alleviate any 
underprovision of effort by making wages more sensitive to output, and hence, to 
effort. Moreover, observing skills enables competition to correctly price any change 
of skills into wages, thereby inducing efficient incentives in pure  human-capital 
settings via Becker’s logic. In pure  career-concerns settings, however, it destroys the 
possibility of building a reputation, as beliefs cannot be affected.
In reality, obtaining arbitrarily precise information about skills or having access 
to the whole current history of output realizations as in the baseline model is, in 
1 Cisternas (2017) allows for nonlinear payoffs using the signal technology of a pure  career-concerns model. 
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many instances, prohibitively costly or simply impossible; potential employers must 
usually rely on coarser measures of performance to assess workers’ skills when the 
latter are hidden. Prominent examples are online platforms that facilitate the match-
ing between potential employers and workers, such as freelancers, lawyers, and 
doctors, by offering compressed information about past performance in the form 
of “scores” or “ratings.”2 In those marketplaces,  employer-employee matches are 
in many instances  short-lived, and passing information about performance to future 
employers occurs only through the platform’s ratings process.
Building on recent methods by Hörner and Lambert (2016) on information struc-
tures for pure  career-concerns models, Section IV presents an example of how infor-
mation design can be used as a policy tool to ameliorate the underinvestment result 
found in pure  human-capital settings. This is done in a context where skills are 
stationary and the demand side operates as  short-term employers who have access 
to a single signal about performance. Intuitively, ratings that exacerbate past per-
formance (relative to the beliefs that arise in the baseline model) generate poste-
rior means that are less responsive to changes in such ratings, reflecting that belief 
updating under these forms of coarser information structures accounts for the exces-
sive weight attached to past information. For sufficiently persistent skills, the rating 
studied takes advantage of the high autocorrelation of skills by discounting past 
information heavily, thereby making beliefs very responsive to performance. This, 
in turn, generates incentives arbitrarily close to efficiency.
Related Literature.—The reputation literature employing exogenous types is 
vast. In the context of ex ante symmetric uncertainty, Holmström (1982, 1999) ana-
lyzes career concerns when effort and skills are substitutes in the production func-
tion; complementarities are studied by Dewatripont, Jewitt, and Tirole (1999a,b) in 
a  two-period context and by Bonatti and Hörner (2017) in a dynamic setting with 
coarse information. Other forms of reputation building, such as mimicking irratio-
nal types (Fudenberg and Levine 1992, Faingold and Sannikov 2011) and signaling 
(Spence 1973, Mailath and Samuelson 2001), rely on asymmetric information.
This paper also contributes to the literature on strategic models of hidden or 
unverifiable investments. Regarding agency models, Kahn and Huberman (1988) 
and Prendergast (1993) find that  up-or-out contracts and promotions can sometimes 
alleviate  hold-up problems when workers can invest in  firm-specific human capital 
and output is  non-contractible; I instead explore  market-based incentives in settings 
where competition and human capital of a general nature make such problems mute. 
More recently, a growing body of literature on stochastic games with hidden invest-
ments has analyzed strategic behavior drawing mostly on firms’ reputations as the 
main source of inspiration. Bohren (2016) and Huangfu (2015) study general mod-
els in which a  long-run player can affect an observable  payoff-relevant state that 
accumulates slowly. Board and  Meyer-ter-Vehn (2013) and Dilmé (2016) focus on 
unobservable investments in settings where the state is hidden and can change dis-
cretely, and information about it arrives infrequently. From a modeling  perspective, 
2 Some examples are upwork.com (freelancers), healthgrades.com (doctors), and avvo.com (lawyers). 
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the setting I study, like the first two papers, incorporates a  payoff-relevant state that 
changes gradually; in line with the second group, this stock is hidden and inferred 
from a public signal. From an economic perspective, these papers are concerned 
with how incentives may vary across different levels of reputation; in contrast, I shut 
down this channel to isolate how such incentives depend on the degree of uncer-
tainty about current economic conditions exclusively.
The study of  nonstrategic investments in human capital began with Becker 
(1962), who introduced the distinction between general and specific skills. In the 
model I analyze, human capital is general or  task-specific (Gibbons and Waldman 
2004) rather than specific to the firm.  Ben-Porath (1967) adopts an  optimal-control 
approach with certainty in contexts in which training in general skills drives 
resources away from production; in contrast, I study skill accumulation result-
ing from effort directly devoted to production. On the demand side, a large body 
of work analyzes an employer’s incentives to invest in general skills when labor 
markets are imperfect (e.g., Acemoglu and Pischke 1999). I instead focus on the 
supply side, with the imperfection being the unobservability of workers’ produc-
tivities and actions.
Finally, this paper contributes to the literature using  continuous-time methods to 
analyze learning environments. Jovanovic (1979) analyzes  labor-market outcomes 
in settings where firms and workers learn about the quality of their match and there 
is turnover. More closely related are strategic models of symmetric uncertainty 
that exploit the tractability of Holmström’s  signal-jamming technology: Cisternas 
(2018) studies  learning-driven ratchet effects; Hörner and Lambert (2017) exam-
ines optimal (Gaussian) information structures for pure  career-concerns models; 
and Prat and Jovanovic (2014) and DeMarzo and Sannikov (2017) study optimal 
contracts with learning.
Outline.—Section I describes the basics of the baseline model, while Section II 
performs the corresponding equilibrium analysis. Section III examines general deter-
ministic  skill-accumulation technologies. Section IV studies information design as 
a policy tool. All of the proofs are contained in Section A of the Appendix, whereas 
Section B discusses the model’s prediction on wages.
I. Baseline Model
A. Output and Human Capital Technologies
A worker and a pool of potential employers (or market) interact over an infinite 
horizon. While working with any employer, the worker produces output continu-
ously over time. Cumulative output  ( ξ t ) t≥0 evolves according to the technology
(1)  d  ξ t = (λ  a t +  θ t )dt +  σ ξ d  Z t ξ , t ≥ 0, 
where  (  Z t ξ ) t≥0 is a Brownian motion. In this specification,  θ t represents any aspect of 
the worker’s time- t productive capability that exhibits persistence (and thus behaves 
as a stock variable); I refer to it as the worker’s skills at time  t . By contrast,  a t 
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denotes the worker’s effort at the same time; this (flow) choice variable takes values 
in an interval  [ 0,  A ̅ ] , with  A ̅ > 0 sufficiently large. The parameter  σ ξ > 0 measures 
the volatility of shocks to output, and  λ ∈ [ 0, 1 ] is a scalar that captures the impor-
tance of effort as a direct input to production.3
The worker’s skills are governed by the dynamic
(2)  d  θ t = (κ  θ t + (1 − λ )  a t )dt +  σ θ d  Z t θ , t ≥ 0, 
where  ( Z t θ ) t≥0 is a Brownian motion independent of  ( Z t ξ ) t≥0 , and  κ is a scalar. The 
drift of (2),  κ  θ t + (1 − λ )  a t , reflects that skills are affected by the worker’s effort 
choices. When  λ = 1 , skills evolve exogenously and effort is solely a direct input 
to production, resulting in a pure  career-concerns model. Instead, when  λ = 0 , 
skills are the only input in (1), and effort is solely an input to skills; I refer to this 
case as a pure  human-capital model.
The solution to (2) as a function of past effort choices and productivity shocks is
(3)  θ t =  e κt  θ 0 +  ∫ 0 t  e κ(t−s) (1 − λ)  a s ds +  ∫ 0 t  e κ(t−s)  σ θ d  Z s θ , t ≥ 0. 
Observe first that the second term on the  right-hand side of (3) measures the total 
amount of skills acquired on the job. Importantly, the technology through which 
the worker becomes endogenously more skilled is given by the linear function 
a ↦ (1 − λ ) a in the drift of (2), which is deterministic. General  skill-accumulation 
technologies are studied in Section III.
Second, observe that, as  κ grows, past productivity shocks  (  Z s θ : 0 ≤ s ≤ t ) 
have a higher weight on current skills; i.e., shocks to productivity become more 
persistent.4 Thus,  κ captures the degree of autocorrelation of skills. If  κ < 0 , the 
worker’s skills are  mean-reverting, as the drift of (2) satisfies
  κ  θ t + (1 − λ )  a t = − | κ | (  θ t −  (1 − λ )  a t / | κ|   η t :=
 ) = − |κ | (  θ t −  η t ); 
i.e., skills tend to move towards the (potentially)  time-varying trend  (  η t ) t≥0 at rate |κ| . Instead, when  κ ≥ 0 , productivity shocks have permanent effects on skills.5
REMARK 1: Holmström’s (1999) seminal analysis corresponds to a pure 
 career-concerns model ( λ = 1 ), in which skills either evolve as a random walk 
( κ = 0 and  σ θ > 0 ) or are fixed over time and drawn from a normal distribution ( κ =  σ θ = 0 ).
3 In this  continuous-time setting, therefore, the interval  [ t, t + dt ) ,  dt small, can be interpreted as the relevant 
time unit of production. Realized output over the same “period” is then given by the increment  d  ξ t ; on average, 
output will change at rate  λ  a t +  θ t at time  t ≥ 0 . 
4 Alternatively, since  e −κs is continuous of bounded variation,  ∫ 0 t  e κ(t−s) d  Z s θ =  Z t θ + κ  ∫ 0 t  e κ(t−s)  Z s θ ds almost 
surely, where the last integral is of the  Riemann-Stieltjes type (due to  Z t θ ∈ C( [ 0, t ] ; ℝ ) ,  t ≥ 0 ). See, for instance, 
Theorem 2.3.7, in Kuo (2000). 
5 The model could be interpreted as one in which skills are fixed over time but their value in a (potentially rap-
idly) changing world varies stochastically. 
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REMARK 2: Specifications of productivity such as (2) have found support in labor 
economics. Specifically, Farber and Gibbons (1996) and Kahn and Lange (2014) 
find that Gaussian models of skills that exhibit autocorrelation fit data on wages 
better than models in which productivity is fixed over time (or in which productivity 
is stochastic, but observable—Kahn and Lange 2014). These papers are concerned 
with empirically testing the hypothesis that employers learn about workers’ produc-
tivities, and hence, they do not model incentives.6
B. Information and  Labor-Market Structures
The output process (1) is publicly observed by all the agents in the economy, 
while effort choices are directly observed by the worker only. The skill process (2) 
is hidden to everyone, and all market participants share the prior that its initial value, 
θ 0 , is normally distributed with mean  p 0 ∈ ℝ and variance  γ 0 ∈  ℝ + (i.e., there 
is ex ante symmetric uncertainty). Thus, output is the only source of information 
about skills to everyone, and it fully determines the market’s information structure. 
Denote by   t the market’s time- t information (which consists of the observations 
 ξ t  ≔ (  ξ s  :  0 ≤ s < t ) exclusively), and  (  t ) t≥0 the corresponding public 
filtration.
Since output is affected by the worker’s actions, the market must anticipate the 
worker’s behavior to correctly interpret  (  ξ t ) t≥0 . The market must then conjecture 
the worker’s behavior to learn about skills, as his actions are effectively hidden due 
to the output technology (1) satisfying the full support assumption with respect 
to his effort choices. In this line, let  ( a t ∗ ) t≥0 denote the market’s conjecture of the (pure) strategy followed by the worker (which, in equilibrium, must be correct), 
and observe that  a t ∗ can be a function of time and of the current public history,  ξ t , 
only.7 The market’s conditional expectation operator under the belief that  ( a t ∗ ) t≥0 is 
driving (1)–(2) is then denoted by  E  a ∗  [  ⋅  |   t ] ,  t ≥ 0 .
The demand side of the labor market is competitive (e.g., the pool of employers 
consists of a large number of small agents), and no  output-contingent contract can 
be written. As a result, competition forces wages to reflect, at any point in time, the 
market’s expectation of production over the next instant; i.e., the market is spot. The 
time- t wage,  w t , then satisfies
(4)  w t ≔  lim h→0  
 E a* [ ξ t+h −  ξ t |   t ]  ____________
h
 =  E a* [λ a t +  θ t |   t ] =  λa t ⁎ +  p t ⁎ ,
where  p t ∗ ≔  E  a ∗  [  θ t |   t ] ,  t ≥ 0 , is a measure of the worker's reputation. I some-
times write  w t [  p t ∗ ,  a t ∗ ] to emphasize the dependence of  w t on the pair  (  p t ∗ ,  a t ∗ ) , and 
refer to  (  w t ) t≥0 as the wage process.8
6 See also Altonji and Pierret (2001) for a model of employer learning in which unobserved productivity is 
constant over time. 
7 The formal definition of a strategy is introduced in the next subsection. 
8 Since the marker’s behavior is fully summarized by (4), the market plays no strategic role in the subsequent 
analysis. Also, because the worker internalizes all of the expected surplus at all points in time and human capital is 
equally valued elsewhere, the worker has no strict incentive to switch employers. 
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C. Strategies, Payoffs, and Equilibrium Concept
A (pure) strategy  (  a t ) t≥0 for the worker is any progressively measurable process 
with respect to  (  t ) t≥0 , taking values in  [ 0,  A ̅ ] , and such that (1)–(2) admits a solu-
tion.9 Intuitively, at any time  t , the worker takes an action  a t ∈ [ 0,  A ̅ ] as a function 
of the current history  ξ t and time,  t ≥ 0 .10
The worker is risk neutral and discounts flow payoffs according to a discount rate 
r > 0 . Exerting effort is costly, which is captured by a strictly increasing and con-
vex function g :  [ 0,  A ̅ ] → ℝ with  g(0) =  g ′ (0) = 0 . Consequently, given the wage 
process (4), the total payoff from following the strategy  ( a t ) t≥0 is given by
(5)  E a [ ∫ 0 ∞  e −rt (  w t [  p t ∗ ,  a t ∗ ] − g(  a t )) dt] . 
The notation  E a [ ⋅ ] simply emphasizes that different strategies  (  a t ) t≥0 affect the 
likelihood of different realizations of  (  ξ t ) t≥0 , which in turn determine the realiza-
tions of the wage process.
In the following, I assume that the rate of change of skills satisfies  κ ∈ (−∞, r ) ; 
this is a necessary and sufficient condition for payoffs to be well-defined. The focus 
is on Nash equilibria of the previous game between the market and the worker.
DEFINITION 1 (Nash Equilibrium): A pure strategy  (  a t ∗ ) t≥0 is a Nash equilibrium 
if (i)  (  a t ) t≥0 =  (  a t ∗ ) t≥0 maximizes (5) subject to (1)–(2) and  w t = λ  a t ∗ +  p t ∗ , 
t ≥ 0 , among all pure strategies; and (ii)  (  p t ∗ ) t≥0 is constructed via Bayes’ rule 
using  (  a t ∗ ) t≥0 . A Nash equilibrium is deterministic if  (  a t ∗ ) t≥0 is a function of calen-
dar time only.
In a Nash equilibrium, the worker finds it optimal to follow the market’s conjec-
ture of play at all times. Thus, along the path of play, (i) the worker’s behavior is 
sequentially rational, and (ii) the market holds a correct belief about his skills at all 
times.11
Deterministic equilibria are of interest because, as shown in the next section, 
learning is Gaussian; hence, the market’s and the worker’s posterior beliefs can be 
summarized by their corresponding (stochastic) posterior means (in the case of the 
market, by  p t ∗ ,  t ≥ 0 ) and a common deterministic variance.
9 Because the action space is bounded, additional integrability conditions usually needed to define strategies 
(such as  E[  ∫ 0 t  a s 2 ds ] < ∞ ,  t ≥ 0 ) are automatically satisfied here. The set of pure strategies is  nonempty, as any 
deterministic  (  a t ) t≥0 clearly induces a unique solution to (1), where  θ t is given by (3) (i.e., the system can be solved 
in two steps; first (2), then (1)). For strategies that depend  non-trivially on  (  ξ t ) t≥0 , existence is usually shown using 
Girsanov’s theorem (in particular, observe that this reduces to showing existence for (1) with  θ t as in (3), as  (  a t ) t≥0 
depends explicitly on the realizations of  (  ξ t ) t≥0 , but not of  (  Z t θ ) t≥0 ). 
10 For the analysis of equilibrium outcomes (i.e., actions and payoffs), leaving the worker’s behavior after devi-
ations unspecified is without loss, as the market can never observe the worker’s actions. 
11 Regarding (ii), see Section IIA for the law of motion of  (  p t ∗ ) t≥0 and its dependence on  (  a t ∗ ) t≥0 . 
VOL. 10 NO. 2 161CISTERNAS: CAREER CONCERNS AND THE NATURE OF SKILLS
D. Discussion: On Deterministic Equilibria
More generally, the deterministic equilibria studied here belong to a larger class 
of Markov equilibria in which the worker’s equilibrium behavior depends on the 
history of the game only through the value that the common belief takes. In fact, 
since posterior means and time (through the posterior variance) fully characterize 
posterior beliefs when learning is Gaussian, deterministic equilibria are simply 
Markov equilibria in which the dependence on  p t ∗ is absent.
Deterministic equilibria depend partly on the worker’s flow payoff being linear 
in the public belief (via  w t = λ  a t ∗ +  p t ∗ ).12 If the linearity assumption is relaxed (as it is when the wage is a nonlinear function of  p t ∗ ), incentives will depend on the 
stochastic history of the game through  p t ∗ : intuitively, since in this case the myopic 
return from affecting the public belief vary across different levels of reputation, so 
does the fully  forward-looking value of being perceived as more skilled. This depen-
dence is in fact the object of study of Cisternas (2018), where games of symmetric 
uncertainty about an exogenous state are analyzed. Importantly, these two papers are 
complementary. First, in Cisternas (2018), learning is stationary, and hence, beliefs 
can be identified with posterior means. Reducing beliefs to a  one-dimensional state, 
in turn, simplifies the task of proving the existence of Markov equilibria when nonlin-
earities are present. In contrast, the current paper imposes no restriction on the initial 
degree of uncertainty about skills, but it constrains flow payoffs to be linear. Second, 
the approaches to performing equilibrium analysis followed in these papers differ, 
as  off-path private beliefs complicate the analysis when nonlinearities are present; 
in contrast, in this baseline linear model, the same strategy is optimal on and off the 
path of play.
II. Baseline Model: Equilibrium Analysis
In what follows, I fix a deterministic strategy  (  a t ∗ ) t≥0 as the market’s conjecture.
A. Learning Dynamics
By standard results in filtering theory, the distribution of  θ t conditional on   t is 
Gaussian, and thus, the market’s posterior belief is characterized by its mean and 
variance.13 Recall that  p t ∗ ≔  E  a ∗  [  θ t |   t ] , and let  γ t ≔  E  a ∗  [  (  θ t −  p t ∗ ) 2 |   t ] denote 
the variance of the posterior belief at time  t ≥ 0 . The  Kalman-Bucy filter provides 
the laws of motion for these states.
LEMMA 1: The market’s posterior mean and variance evolve according to
(6)  d p t ∗ = (κ  p t ⁎ + (1 − λ )  a t ∗ )dt +   γ t  __  σ ξ 2 [ d  ξ t − (λ  a t 
∗ +  p t ∗ )dt ] ,  t > 0,   p 0 =  p 0 ,   
12 To the best of my knowledge, no equilibrium in which behavior explicitly depends on the stochastic history 
of the game  ξ t has been documented in settings in which the signal technology is additively separable; uncertainty 
is symmetric and Gaussian; and flow payoffs are linear. 
13 See Theorem 11.1 in Liptser and Shiryaev (1977). This follows from the action space being compact and the 
coefficients in (1)–(2) being constant (which ensure that conditions (11.4)–(11.11) in the theorem are met). 
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and
(7)  γ ̇t = 2κ  γ t +  σ θ 2 −  (  γ t  __ σ ξ  ) 
2 , t > 0,   γ 0 ∈  ℝ + , 
where  Z t  a ∗  ≔  1 __  σ ξ ( ξ t −  ∫ 0 t (λ  a s ∗ +  p s ∗ )ds) is a Brownian motion with respect to  (  t ) t≥0 
from the market’s perspective.
PROOF:
See Theorem 12.1 in Liptser and Shiryaev (1977).  ∎ 
The last term in (6) shows that changes in the market’s posterior mean are driven 
by the realizations of  σ ξ d  Z t  a ∗  ≔ d  ξ t −  E t  a ∗  [ d  ξ t ] = d  ξ t − (λ  a t ∗ +  p t ∗ )dt , which is 
unpredictable from the market’s perspective. The sensitivity of beliefs to such out-
put surprises is captured by
  β t =   γ t  ___  σ ξ 2 , t ≥ 0, 
which multiplies unanticipated output in (6). Note that this sensitivity is determinis-
tic because, from (7), the posterior variance  (  γ t ) t≥0 is a function of time exclusively: 
when effort and skills are substitutes in the production function, any given change in 
the worker’s action shifts the distribution of output by an amount that is independent 
of the current value that skills take, thereby leaving the informativeness of the output 
signal unaffected.
Because (6) is linear in  p t ∗ , it admits a solution that is a linear function of past 
output realizations:
(8)  p t ∗ =   p 0  e − ∫ 0 t( β s −κ)ds +  ∫ 0 t  e − ∫ st ( β u −κ)du (1 − λ )  a s ∗ ds
 +  ∫ 
0
 t  e − ∫ st ( β u −κ)du  β s [ d  ξ s −  a s ∗ ds ] . 
In this expression, the last term shows how the market corrects the output signal 
using the conjecture  ( a t ∗ ) t≥0 in an attempt to construct an unbiased signal of the 
worker’s current skills. In addition, observe that the sensitivity process  (  β t ) t≥0 also 
affects the weight that beliefs attach to past output observations, as captured in 
e − ∫ st ( β u −κ)du ,  t ≥ s .
The worker’s belief about his own skills is summarized in dynamics analogous to 
(6)–(7) but replacing the market’s conjecture of equilibrium play,  ( a t ∗ ) t≥0 , with the 
worker’s actual strategy,  ( a t ) t≥0 (in particular, the corresponding posterior variances 
coincide). The worker’s posterior mean,  (  p t ) t≥0 , evolves according to
  d p t = (κ  p t + (1 − λ )  a t )dt +  β t  σ ξ d  Z t , t ≥ 0, 
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where  Z t ≔  1 __  σ ξ (  ξ t −  ∫ 0 t (λ  a t +  p s ) ds ) is a Brownian motion from the work-
er’s  perspective.14 Equivalently, from his standpoint, output follows  d  ξ t = (λ  a t +  p t )dt +  σ ξ d  Z t ,  t ≥ 0 .
Since the market’s conjecture is deterministic, there are only two channels 
through which the worker can influence his wage process,  w t = λ  a t ∗ +  p t ∗ ,  t ≥ 0 : 
by influencing the market’s posterior mean via the channel of his actions directly 
affecting output; and by influencing the market’s posterior mean via the channel of 
his actions indirectly affecting output as he becomes endogenously more productive. 
Specifically, from (8), only the term
(9)  ∫ 
0
 t  e − ∫ st ( β u −κ)du  β s  d ξ s =  ∫ 0 t  e − ∫ st ( β u −κ)du  β s [ (λ  a s +  p s )dt +  σ ξ d  Z s ],  t ≥ 0, 
can be affected by the worker’s actions, where in the last term I have used that 
d  ξ t = (λ  a t +  p t )dt +  σ ξ d  Z t from the worker’s viewpoint. Moreover, because 
 (  Z t ) t≥0 is exogenous, only the component
(10)  Y t  ≔  ∫ 0 t  e − ∫ st ( β u −κ)du  β s (λ  a s +  p s ) ds, t ≥ 0 
of the wage process matters for the worker’s incentives (i.e., for his effort choices).
To conclude, observe that the worker’s flow payoff is linear in  Y t and the pair (  Y t ,  p t ) t≥0 is linear in the worker’s action. As a result, deterministic equilibria can be 
found via using pointwise optimization in the worker’s problem. However, to better 
illustrate how learning and strategic behavior interplay depending on the nature of 
skills, the next two subsections study changes in  (  Y t ,  p t ) t≥0 in a heuristic fashion, 
and separately for the cases of pure career concerns and pure human capital. The 
formal arguments are direct corollaries of Proposition 5 in Section III, which con-
tains the main characterization result for deterministic equilibria.
B. Pure  Career-Concerns Model
Consider now a pure  career-concerns model (i.e.,  λ = 1 ) and contemplate a 
marginal increase in the worker’s time- t effort along the path of play over a small 
period of time  dt > 0 ; namely, a deviation  (  a t ) t≥0 such that  a t =  a t ∗ + ϵ over [ t, t + dt ) ,  ϵ small, and  a s =  a s ∗ for  s ≠ t . Denote by  ∂  w s / ∂ a t the change in the 
wage at time  s > t resulting from this effort increase. From the previous subsec-
tion,  ∂ w s /∂ a t = ∂ p s ∗ / ∂ a t = ∂ Y s / ∂ a t , where  ∂ p s ∗ / ∂ a t and  ∂ Y s / ∂ a t have analogous 
interpretations.
Since the worker’s own belief process,  (  p t ) t≥0 , is exogenous when there is no 
skill accumulation, inspection of  (  Y t ) t≥0 in (10) shows that
  ∂Y ___∂ a t   =  [ β t  e 
− ∫ ts ( β u − κ)du ]ϵ dt, s  ≥  t.15
14 These results also follow from Theorem 12.1 in Liptser and Shiryaev (1977). 
15 Formally, given a :  ℝ + → [0,  
_
 A ] measurable, let  D v Y s [a] ≔  lim α→0   Y s [a + αv] −  Y s [a]  ______________α denote the direc-
tional derivative of  Y s at a in the direction  v :  ℝ + → ℝ integrable (which is well-defined given that  Y t is a Lebesgue 
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Intuitively, the deviation leads to an immediate response of the market’s belief of 
size  β t ϵdt : output over  [ t, t + dt ) increases by  λϵdt = ϵdt , whereas  p t ∗ responds to 
contemporaneous output with sensitivity  β t in (6). However, as learning progresses, 
this initial response decays exponentially according to  e − ∫ ts ( β u −κ)du ,  s > t .
The value of the additional wage stream consequence of this deviation is thus 
given by
(11)   ∫ 
t
∞  e −r(s−t)  ∂ w s  ____∂ a t   ds =  [ β t  ∫ t
∞  e − ∫ ts (r−κ+ β u )du ds]   μ t  ≔
 ϵdt =  μ t ϵdt, t ≥ 0, 
and the total change in payoffs is given by  [  μ t −  g ′ (  a t ∗ ) ] ϵdt , ϵ small. In a determinis-
tic equilibrium, therefore,  g′(  a t ∗ ) =  μ t must hold at all times; otherwise, the worker 
could increase his payoff by suitably choosing  ϵ .
Importantly, because  (  μ t ) t≥0 is independent of the worker’s past actions and out-
put history, changes in effort today have no consequences for future behavior. Thus, 
the  first-order condition  g ′ (  a t ∗ ) =  μ t is also sufficient.
PROPOSITION 1 (Equilibrium behavior): In a pure  career-concerns model, there 
is a unique deterministic equilibrium that is characterized by
(12)  g ′ (  a t ∗ ) =  μ t  ≔  β t  ∫ t ∞  e − ∫ ts (r−κ+ β u )du ds, t ≥ 0. 
PROOF:
See the Appendix.  ∎ 
As argued earlier, the sensitivity of beliefs to output surprises,  β t =  γ t /  σ ξ 2, 
t ≥ 0 , plays a dual role in the impulse response of beliefs, and hence, in the overall 
responsiveness of wages: it measures their initial reaction ( β t outside the integral) 
and it affects their rate of decay ( (  β s ) s≥t present in the exponential). Importantly, 
for large enough  γ 0 ,  (  γ t ) t≥0 is decreasing, and hence, there are two opposing forces 
affecting incentives as learning progresses. First, beliefs become less responsive 
to output surprises, which puts downward pressure on incentives; I refer to this as 
the sensitivity effect, captured by  β t outside the integral. Second, any change in the 
public belief has more persistence, which in turn strengthens the worker’s incen-
tives to exert effort; I refer to this as the persistence effect, driven by  (  β s ) s≥t in the 
exponential.
The next result shows that the sensitivity effect always dominates. To this end, let
(13)  γ ∗  ≔  σ ξ 2( √ _________  κ 2 +  (  σ θ / σ ξ ) 2 + κ) 
integral). Then,  D v Y s [a] =  ∫ 0 s  e − ∫ ts ( β u − κ)du  β t  v t  dt from where it is clear that ∂ Y s /∂ a t =  D ϵ 1 [t, t+dt)   Y s [a]. The same 
notion of directional derivative is behind all other forms of sensitivities ∂ · /∂ a t discussed in the paper.
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denote the variance of the market’s  long-run posterior belief when skills evolve as in 
(2) (i.e., the unique strictly positive stationary solution of (7)).16 In particular, note that 
asymptotically, beliefs react to output surprises according to the sensitivity parameter
  β ∗  ≔   γ ∗  ___ σ ξ 2 =  √ 
_______  κ 2 +  σ θ 2/  σ ξ 2 + κ, 
and that past output observations are discounted at the constant rate  β ∗ − κ . 
Whenever convenient, the dependence of  γ ∗ and  β ∗ on  κ is explicitly stated.
PROPOSITION 2 (Dynamics and convergence): Suppose that  γ 0 >  γ ∗ . Then, (  a t ∗ ) t≥0 is strictly decreasing. In the limit,
(14) g′( a t ⁎ ) →   β 
⁎  _________  
r +  β * − κ  =  
 √ _______  κ 2 +  σ θ 2/  σ ξ 2 + κ  ______________ √ _  κ 2 +  σ θ 2/  σ ξ 2 + r , as t → ∞.
In particular,  long-run incentives are increasing in  κ ∈ (−∞, r ) .
PROOF:
See the Appendix.  ∎ 
The reason behind the decreasing time profile of effort lies in the nature of the 
learning process. Specifically, since learning is Gaussian, time is a sufficient statistic 
for the current degree of uncertainty about skills; and this uncertainty decays mono-
tonically if  γ 0 >  γ ∗ . The fact that the sensitivity effect dominates the discount-
ing effect simply reflects that beliefs’ overall responsiveness to new information 
over long horizons decreases as learning progresses, thus diminishing the effect that 
effort has on wages over time.17
The same logic reveals why the worker’s  long-run incentives—character-
ized by the ratio  β ∗ (κ)/(r +  β ∗ (κ )  − κ ) —become stronger as skills become 
more autocorrelated (notice that the ratio is increasing in κ due to r − κ > 0 and 
κ ↦  β ∗ (κ ) being increasing). In fact, since the environment becomes more 
uncertain as productivity shocks gain more persistence (i.e.,  ∂ γ ∗ (κ)/∂ κ > 0 ), 
beliefs must become more responsive to output surprises overall; but the above ratio 
is precisely a measure of such overall responsiveness of beliefs.
The previous discussion suggests that the persistence of shocks to productivity 
can potentially have important effects on the size of the incentives created by career 
concerns. Formally, observe that, in this pure  career-concerns setting, total surplus 
satisfies
 E [ ∫ 0 ∞  e −rt (d  ξ t − g(  a t )dt )] = E [ ∫ 0 ∞  e −rt (  a t − g(  a t )) dt] + E  [ ∫ 0 ∞  e −rt  θ t  dt]   exogenous . 
16 Observe from (7) that, when  γ 0 >  γ ∗ ,  (  γ t ) t≥0 converges to  γ ∗ monotonically from the right. 
17 As a corollary, the decreasing patterns of incentives found by Holmström (1999) in the constant skills 
( κ =  σ θ = 0 ) and random walk ( κ = 0,   σ θ > 0 ) cases are recovered. 
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Thus, the efficient effort policy entails a constant effort level  a e characterized by 
 g′( a e ) ≡ 1 .
While inspection of (14) shows that  long-run incentives are always inefficiently 
low, the next proposition shows that, given any degree of impatience  r > 0 , high 
levels of autocorrelation in skills can lead to inefficiently high effort early in a career, 
provided that there is enough initial uncertainty. To this end, let  a 0 ∗ (κ;  γ 0 ) denote the 
initial level of effort that arises in equilibrium as a function of  κ for a fixed level of 
initial variance  γ 0 .
PROPOSITION 3: Suppose that  γ 0 >  σ ξ 2 (  √ _______  r 2 +  σ θ 2/  σ ξ 2 + r ) . Then,  a 0 ∗ (κ;  γ 0 ) >  a e for  κ sufficiently close to  r .18
PROOF:
See the Appendix.  ∎ 
To understand the result, recall first that the market always believes that the 
worker exerts effort according to  (  a t ∗ ) t≥0 . Thus, upon observing an output surprise, 
the market must determine what fraction of such unexpected output is the conse-
quence of a change in skills versus a shock to output. That is, the market faces an 
identification problem.
Importantly, a small deviation from  a t ∗ , like noise, is unobservable, and affects 
only current output. The identification problem thus leads the market to always 
attach a positive probability to an output surprise consequence of additional effort 
instead of being the outcome of a productivity shock. Productivity shocks, how-
ever, unlike noise, have persistent effects on output via the persistence of the skill 
process. Under sufficiently high initial uncertainty and autocorrelation in skills, the 
impulse response (i.e., the sensitivity and persistence of beliefs combined over long 
horizons) is strong enough to allow effort to have a persistent effect on wages that is 
larger than its transitory impact on output, yielding inefficiently high effort.
REMARK 3: Holmström (1999) shows that efficiency can be attained when skills 
evolve as a random walk and the variance of the posterior belief is stationary by let-
ting the worker become patient (i.e.,  κ = 0 ,  γ 0 =  σ ξ 2  σ θ 2, and  r ↘ 0 ). Instead, (14) 
shows that, given any discount rate  r > 0 ,  long-run effort converges to efficiency 
provided that the skill process exhibits enough persistence (i.e.,  r > 0 is fixed, and 
κ ↗ r ). This complementary exercise is useful because it shows that, for the case of 
deterministic equilibria, efficiency occurs if and only if the worker attains unbounded 
utility. Specifically, it is easy to see that the worker’s equilibrium utility satisfies
 E [ ∫ 0 ∞  e −rt (  a t ∗ +  p t ∗ − g(  a t ∗ )) dt] =   p 0  ____ r − κ +  ∫ 0 ∞  e −rt (  a t ∗ − g(  a t ∗ )) dt  
bounded
 , 
18 This exercise fixes an initial level of uncertainty  γ 0 (beyond a threshold), and then increases the degree of 
autocorrelation of skills to show that excessively high effort is an equilibrium outcome. An alternative exercise 
would involve fixing  κ ≥ 0 and  σ θ ≥ 0 , and then making  γ 0 arbitrarily large. While such an exercise can poten-
tially lead to inefficiently high effort, too (as it can be easily verified in a  two-period model with a fixed type), it is 
not pursued here, as the interest is on the impact of the degree of persistence on incentives. 
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from where utility diverges as κ → r.19 However, there are a plethora of config-
urations  (r, κ ) such that, starting from  γ 0 close to  γ ∗ (κ ) , incentives are arbi-
trarily close to efficiency and utility still bounded. Finally, observe that efficiency 
can be approximated only when  κ ≥ 0 : it is only in this case that beliefs have 
enough persistence to offset the negative effect that the rate of impatience  r has on 
 β ∗ (κ )/(r − κ +  β ∗ (κ )) , thus generating an impact on wages of net present value 
close to 1.20
C. Pure  Human-Capital Model
Consider now a pure  human-capital model, i.e., effort influences the evolution of 
skills, but not output ( λ = 0 ).
In this context, the main finding of this section pertains to an univocally negative 
prediction that the identification problem faced by the market has on the incentives 
to invest in human capital: in contrast to pure  career-concerns settings, the worker 
always underinvests in skill accumulation, regardless of both the degree of initial 
uncertainty and autocorrelation of skills. In addition, this incentive problem, as in 
the previous case, worsens over time.
For illustrational purposes, I proceed heuristically in a way that parallels the 
analysis of the previous section; i.e., by considering a deviation  (  a t ) t≥0 such that 
 a t =  a t ∗ + ϵ over  [ t, t + dt ) ,  ϵ small, and  a s =  a s ∗ for  s ≠ t . From the worker’s 
perspective, his skills satisfy
(15)  p s =  p t  e κ(s−t) +  ∫ t s  e κ(s−u)  a u  du +  ∫ t s  e κ(s−u)  β u  σ ξ  d Z u , s ≥ t. 
Consequently, from the second term in the previous expression, the worker expects 
his time- s skills to increase by  ∂ p s / ∂ a t ≔  e κ(s−t) ϵ dt ,  s ≥ t due to the deviation. 
Inspection of  (  Y t ) t≥0 (see display (10)) then yields that the time- s wage changes by
 
∂ w s  ____∂ a t  =  
∂ Y s  ____∂ a t =  [ ∫ t
s  e − ∫ us ( β v −κ)dv  β u  e κ(u−t) du] ϵdt =  e κ(s−t) [1 −  e − ∫ t
s β u du ] ϵdt, 
as the additional investment at time  t affects all intermediate values of skills over 
[ t, s ] . The term in brackets plays an important role: it reflects that only a fraction 
19 In fact, since  p t =  p t ∗ in equilibrium, then  E [ p t ∗ |   0 ] = E [ e κt  p 0 +  ∫ 0 t  β s  σ ξ  e κ(t−s) d  Z s |   0 ] =  e κt  p 0 
from a  time-zero perspective. Additionally, it is easy to check that actions are bounded by noticing that 
 0 <  β t  ∫ t∞  e − ∫ ts (r+ β u −κ)du ds <  β 0 / (r − κ +  β ∗ ) <  β 0 / (r +  σ θ /  σ ξ ) , where I used that  β ∗ − κ =  (  κ 2 +  σ θ 2/  σ ξ 2 ) 1/2 >  σ θ /  σ ξ .
20 More generally,  β ∗ in the denominator of  β ∗ /(r +  β ∗ − κ ) characterizing incentives can be understood as 
arising from a form of ratcheting. To see this, observe that after a  one-shot upward deviation occurs, the market 
incorrectly increases its expectation of future output, as it mistakenly believes that the worker is more skilled. But 
this implies that the worker becomes privately informed that he will underperform if no additional effort is exerted, 
as his private belief is lower in relative terms. As a result, the impact of an output surprise on wages is dampened by 
β ∗ when such surprise is the consequence of unanticipated effort, as  β ∗ measures the strength of the initial ratcheting 
of beliefs. This form of ratchet effect is transparent when flow payoffs are nonlinear, as in those settings off-path 
private information weakens on-path incentives differently depending on the current level of reputation; in contrast, 
in linear settings, the strength of this effect is uniform across the belief space. See Cisternas (2018) for more details. 
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1 −  e − ∫ ts β u du of the additional time- s output  e κ(s−t) ϵ dt that results from becoming 
more productive actually translates into additional wages.
The total value of the additional wages generated by this investment is thus given 
by
(16)  ∫ 
t
∞  e −r(s−t)  ∂ w s  ____∂ a t   ds =  [ ∫ t
∞ e −r(s−t)  e κ(s−t) [1 −  e − ∫ t s β u du ] ds] ϵ dt
 =   [ 1 ____ r − κ −  ∫ t ∞  e − ∫ t s (r−κ+ β u )du ds]   ρ t ≔ ϵ dt, 
and observe that  ρ t > 0 follows from  β s  ≔  γ s / σ ξ 2 > 0 ,  s ≥ 0 .
Since the total change in payoffs from this investment is, for ϵ small, 
 [  ρ t − g′(  a t ∗ ) ] ϵ dt , and  ρ t is independent of both the worker’s past performance and 
actions, the  first-order condition  g′( a t ∗ ) =  ρ t fully characterizes the worker’s incen-
tives to invest in human capital.
PROPOSITION 4 (Equilibrium investment): In the pure human-capital model, there 
is a unique deterministic equilibrium  (  a t ∗ ) t≥0 that is characterized by
(17)  g ′ (  a t ∗ ) =  ρ t  ≔  1 ____ r − κ −  ∫ t ∞  e − ∫ t s (r−κ+ β u )du ds, t ≥ 0. 
PROOF:
See the Appendix.  ∎ 
To interpret the result, note that the efficient investment policy is constant and 
satisfies
(18)  g′( a e, hc ) =  1 ____ r − κ . 
In fact, from (3),  θ t =  e κt  θ 0 +  ∫ 0 t  e κ(t−s)  a s ds +  ∫ 0 t  e κ(t−s)  σ θ d Z s θ ,  t ≥ 0 , when λ = 0 . Consequently, integration by parts yields that the planner’s problem is to 
maximize
(19)  E [ ∫ 0 ∞ e −rt [ d ξ t − g( a t )] dt] = E [ ∫ 0 ∞ e −rt [ 1 ____ r − κ  a t − g(  a t )] dt] +   E[  θ 0 ] _____r − κ  ⏟exogenous ;  
(18) then follows from point-wise optimization in (19). Intuitively, a marginal 
increase in effort at  t ≥ 0 impacts future skills according to  e κ(s−t) ,  s ≥ t , and 
hence, the additional stream of output created has a value  1 / (r − κ ) . The following 
result holds.
COROLLARY 1 (Underinvestment): In the pure  human-capital model,  a t ∗ <  a e, hc , 
for all  t ≥ 0 .
PROOF:
Follows directly from (17) and (18).  ∎ 
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At the center of this underinvestment result is the second type of ex post error that 
can arise as a result of the identification problem faced by the market.
Specifically, recall that, in a pure  career-concerns setting, the worker’s incen-
tives can be inefficiently high due to the combination of effort having a short-lived 
impact on output, and the market attaching a positive probability to output surprises 
consequence of extra effort instead being driven by changes in skills. In a pure 
 human-capital setting, however, effort choices influence skills directly, and thus 
have persistent effects on output; i.e., they act as productivity shocks. However, due 
to the noise present in the output process, the market now attaches a positive prob-
ability to the output consequences of such investments in skills instead of being the 
outcome of exogenous shocks to the output process. The economic consequence of 
this statistical result is that, as argued earlier, only  1 −  e − ∫ ts β u du of the extra time- s 
output created by a time- t investment is priced into the time- s wage,  s ≥ t . More 
generally, from (17), only a fraction
  1 − (r − κ )  ∫ 
t
∞  e − ∫ ts (r−κ+ β u )du ds ∈ (0, 1) 
of the total output generated by a time- t investment maps into wages. Thus, while 
the identification problem can generate strong incentives by permitting productive 
actions of a  short-term nature to be mistakenly perceived as productivity shocks, it 
can damage incentives by preventing actions that have a  long-term impact on output 
to be fully priced into wages.21
Regarding the dynamics of investment, recall that  (  β t ) t≥0 is strictly decreasing 
when there is enough initial uncertainty. Thus, from (17), the underinvestment prob-
lem worsens over time as information accumulates.
COROLLARY 2 (Dynamics and convergence): Suppose that  γ 0 >  γ ∗ . Then, (  a t ∗ ) t≥0 is strictly decreasing. In the limit,
(20)  g′( a t ∗ ) →  1 _____ r − κ −  1 ________ r −  β ⁎ + κ =  1 _____ r − κ −  1 ________________ r +  √   κ 2 +  σ θ 2/  σ ξ 2 , as t → ∞.   
In particular,  long-run incentives increase in  κ ∈ (−∞, r ) .
The previous corollary is the investment analog of Proposition 2, i.e., the  worker’s 
incentives to invest in human capital are always stronger when the environment 
is more uncertain. In particular, the investments undertaken decay over time if 
uncertainty about the worker monotonically drops, and in the  long run if skills are 
less autocorrelated. As in the pure  career-concerns case, this is the outcome of the 
 market’s belief becoming less responsive overall as the sensitivity  (  β t ) t≥0 shrinks, 
which reduces the returns from exerting effort.22
21 In independent and parallel work, Kahn and Lange (2014) perform a numerical  impulse-response analysis of 
the Kalman filter that leads them to suggest potential underinvestments in human capital. Because in their model 
worker behavior is not modeled, no explanatory mechanism is offered. 
22 Observe that  1/(r − κ)  − 1/(r −  β ∗ + κ )  = [ 1/(r − κ )  ] [  β ∗ / (r − κ +  β ∗ ) ] and so both pure models 
are isomorphic in the long run: for any unit of effort exerted, only  β ∗ / (r − κ +  β ∗ ) < 1 of the output created 
 translates into wages. 
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To complete the analysis of this section, I make two observations. First, while the 
incentives to invest in skills are inefficiently low from a social perspective, they can 
be arbitrarily large relative to the incentives to exert effort when skills are exogenous 
(compare (14) and (20) as  κ ↗ r ). This is because actions have a  long-term impact 
on output when they affect skills, and this impact increases with the persistence of 
the skill process.23
Second, due to the linearity and additive separability of the technologies and 
flow payoffs, it is easy to verify that, in the combined model  λ ∈ (0, 1) , equilib-
rium incentives,  (  a t ∗, λ ) t≥0 , and efficiency,  (  a t e, λ ) t≥0 , are characterized by the linear 
combinations
  g′(  a t ∗, λ ) = λ  μ t + (1 − λ )  ρ t and g′(  a t e, λ ) = λ + (1 − λ )  1 ____ r − κ , 
respectively.24 Thus, for specific configurations of parameters (i.e., large enough 
γ 0 ,  λ , and  κ ), the combined model can contribute to generating incentives closer to 
efficiency early in a worker’s career by averaging the excessive provision of effort as 
a production input, with the low provision of effort as an input to skills. Over time, 
however, inefficiently low effort provision prevails.
The next two sections are devoted to further exploring the robustness of determin-
istic equilibria and the associated underinvestment finding by studying more general 
 skill-accumulation technologies, and the information and labor market structures.
III. Deterministic  Skill-Accumulation Technologies
The baseline model shows that deterministic equilibria can exist even though the 
environment is stochastic. Key to the analysis are that (i) the wage is linear in the 
market’s belief; (ii) actions and skills are substitutes in (1) and (2); and that (iii) 
current effort directly affects the rate of change in contemporaneous skills.
It is easy to see that relaxing (i) or (ii) makes the instantaneous impact of effort 
on wages to depend  on the worker’s reputation, and thus equilibrium behavior 
will depend  non-trivially on past performance (i.e., on the stochastic  history of 
the game). Importantly, since the identification problem faced by the market will 
not disappear in either case, the market will continue excessively punishing output 
surprises that result from unobserved changes in skills. Put differently, the mecha-
nism that drives the underinvestment problem will continue negatively affecting the 
worker’s incentives.
It is then natural to study the robustness of the findings of the previous section 
with respect to (iii). More generally, consider the skill process
(21)  d θ t = (κ  θ t +  η t (  a t )) dt +  σ θ d Z t θ , t ≥ 0, 
23 Convergence to efficiency as  κ ↗ r also occurs in this pure  human-capital setting, now in terms of the 
fraction of total cost of effort exerted (as the efficiency benchmark diverges). Specifically, in the long run, 
 lim κ→r g( a ⁎ )/g( a e,hc ) =  lim κ→r g′( a ⁎ )/g′( a e,hc ) =  lim κ→r [1/(r − κ) − 1/(r +  β ⁎ (κ) − κ)]/[1/(r − κ)] = 1. 
24 These expressions follow directly from (22) and (23) in the next section. 
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where  η t (  a t ) ∈ ℝ encodes how the past history of effort choices, 
 a t ≔ (  a s : 0 ≤ s ≤ t ) , and time itself, affect the current rate of skill change. The 
only economic restriction on such a technology is that it is deterministic. To this end, 
let  ≔ {x :  ℝ + → [0,  
_
 A ] : x is measurable}.
DEFINITION 2: The skill accumulation technology  (  η t ( ⋅ )) t≥0 is said to be 
deterministic if there is η :  ℝ + ×  → ℝ such that (i)  η 0 ( ⋅ ) ≡  η 0 ∈ ℝ , (ii)  η t (x)  =  η t ( x ̂) if  x t =  x ̂t ,  t > 0 , and (iii) for all  x ∈  , the function 
 t ↦  η t (x)  =  η t ( x t ) ∈  L 1 ( ℝ + ) (under the Lebesgue measure).25
I assume that  η 0 is publicly observed, but subsequent values of the trend are hidden 
from all market participants. Because the technology is deterministic, however, once 
a path of effort  (  a t ) t≥0 is fixed, the entire continuation trend  (  η s (  a s )) s≥t is known 
by the worker at time  t ≥ 0 (and thus also known by the market in equilibrium).
The interpretation of the model is that  η 0 represents an observable measure 
of skills upon entering the market (e.g., education). Worker heterogeneity thus 
comes from idiosyncratic realizations of the productivity shocks,  (  Z t θ ) t≥0 .26 
In the  mean-reverting case ( κ < 0 ), for instance, there is a high probability 
that any realization of the skills process fluctuates around the endogenous trend, 
 t ↦  η t ( a t )/ | κ | . Skilled workers are those who experience positive productivity 
shocks that make skills deviate more persistently from its trend.
A. Characterization of Deterministic Equilibria
Consider the model defined by the output and skill processes (1) and (21), with  η 
deterministic. Further, recall that in the baseline model, the functions
  μ t =  β t  ∫ t ∞ e − ∫ ts (r+ β u −κ)du ds and  ρ t =  1 ____ r − κ −  ∫ t ∞ e − ∫ ts (r+ β u −κ)du ds,  t ≥ 0 
characterized incentives in the pure career concerns ( λ = 1 ) and pure human-cap-
ital ( λ = 0 ) model, respectively. Specifically,  μ t captured the reputational value 
of a marginal increase in effort at time  t when effort is a direct production input;  ρ t 
instead captured the reputational value of a marginal investment in skills at  t when 
effort enters directly into the skills process.
The next result presents a characterization of deterministic equilibria as solutions 
to a simplified dynamic optimization problem with certainty; that is, a certainty 
equivalent for the worker’s stochastic optimization problem given a deterministic 
conjecture. The functions  (  μ t ) t≥0 and  (  ρ t ) t≥0 play a key role.
25 Observe that (ii) simply states that  η t (x ) cannot depend on future values  {  x s : s > t} , whereas (iii) ensures 
that payoffs are finite. Importantly, given a public strategy  (  a t ) t≥0 and a realization  ξ ̃ of the public signal, 
 t ↦  a t ( ξ ̃ ) ∈  by definition of progressive measurability; thus, the set of feasible strategies remains unchanged. 
Finally, the definition could be further generalized to  η t = F(t,  x t ,  η  t −  ) , some F :  ℝ + ×  ×  L 1 (ℝ) → ℝ , but 
this requires additional conditions that ensure that a solution  (  η t ) t≥0 exists at the expense of no economic insights. 
26 In addition, specific parameters of the skill accumulation technology could vary across workers as well, but 
this type of heterogeneity is assumed to be observed by the market. 
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PROPOSITION 5 (Certainty Equivalent for Deterministic Equilibria):  a ⁎ :  ℝ + → [0,  _ A ] 
measurable is a deterministic equilibrium if and only if it is the solution to
(22)  max 
a∈ 
   ∫ 
0
 ∞  e −rt [λ  μ t  a t +  ρ t  η t (  a t ) − g(  a t )] dt. 
PROOF:
See the Appendix.  ∎ 
The previous result states that when the  skill-accumulation technology is deter-
ministic, equilibria in which actions depend only on calendar time can arise despite 
the environment being stochastic. Moreover, from the certainty equivalent (22), the 
existence and uniqueness of deterministic equilibria is subject to technical condi-
tions on  η only.
To understand (22), note that, when  η t (  a t ) = (1 − λ )  a t as in the baseline 
model,  g ′ (  a t ∗ ) = λ  μ t + (1 − λ )  ρ t follows from applying point-wise optimization 
to (22); in this case, incentives at different points in time are connected only through 
the way in which uncertainty evolves. Under more general  skill-accumulation tech-
nologies, however, the worker must also take into account how effort today affects 
his future wages via the channel of influencing  η . Incentives thus become linked via 
the marginal impact of effort on the trend.
REMARK 4: The specific technical conditions under which (22) has a solution will 
depend on the particular structure imposed on  (  η t ) t≥0 . Nevertheless, it is import-
ant to stress the generality of this result: it can accommodate complementarities 
between  η t and  a t , multitasking environments, as well as problems of optimal con-
trol (e.g., settings where  (  η t ) t≥0 is the solution to an ordinary differential equation (ODE),  η ̇t = f (t,  a t ,  η t ) ).
B. The Reputational and Social Values of Human Capital
From (22) it is clear that, more generally,  ρ t captures the value of a transitory 
increase in the trend at time  t .27 Thus,  ρ t is a local measure of the reputational value 
of an additional unit of human capital. In contrast, it is easy to verify that the plan-
ner’s solution is given by
(23)  max  ( a t ) t≥0 
   ∫ 
0
 ∞  e −rt [λ  a t +  1 ____ r − κ  η t (  a t ) − g(  a t )] dt. 
Consider now a pure human capital environment, i.e.,  λ = 0 . In this case, inspec-
tion of (22)–(23) shows that the (local) social value of human capital,  1 / (r − κ ) , 
is always above its contemporaneous reputational counterpart,  ρ t ,  t ≥ 0 .28 The 
27 Namely, the value of the additional wages resulting from a strategy  (  a ̂t ) t≥0 such that  η t (  a ̂ t ) =  η t (  a t ) + 1 
and that  η s (  a ̂s ) =  η s (  a s ) for  s ≠ t . 
28 The logic behind this result is analogous to the one found in the baseline model, but now involving the identi-
fication problem faced by the market after a transitory increase in the human capital trend takes place. 
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fact that this ranking is uniform across time suggests that, for technologies that are 
increasing in  a t (in a path-wise sense), the worker will acquire an inefficiently low 
stock of skills. This is because the sensitivity of the worker’s flow payoff to changes 
in the trend is smaller in the equilibrium problem than in the planner’s counterpart.
Policies that increase  ρ t > 0 (thereby reducing the wedge  1 / (r − κ )  − ρ t > 0 ) will generate higher levels of human capital. In particular, a wage sub-
sidy  w t ↦ (1 + α )  w t = (1 + α )  p t ∗ ,  α > 0 , leads to  (1 + α )  ρ t >  ρ t ,  t ≥ 0 . 
Similarly, better monitoring technologies, captured in a reduction in  σ ξ > 0 in (1), 
will increase  (  ρ t ) t≥0 by making beliefs more sensitive to output surprises. This is 
transparent in the case of  long-run incentives, where both
  β ∗ =  √ _______  κ 2 +  σ θ 2/  σ ξ 2 + κ and  ρ ∗ =  1 ____ r − κ −  1 __________ 
r +  √   κ 2 +  σ θ 2/  σ ξ 2
increase as  σ ξ > 0 falls.
To conclude this subsection, I confirm the underinvestment intuition suggested by 
(22)–(23) for the case of linear technologies.
DEFINITION 3: A skill accumulation technology is linear if there are functions 
h :  ℝ + → ℝ and K :  ℝ + 2 →  ℝ + ,  t ≥ 0 , such that
(24)  η t (  a t ) = h(t )  +  ∫ 0 t K(t, s )  a s ds, t ≥ 0, 
and where  ∫ t∞ K(s, t ) ds < ∞ , for all  t ≥ 0 .
In this specification,  h( ⋅ ) captures any aspect of skills growth that varies with 
experience but that is unrelated to the job itself, while  K(t, s ) captures the impact 
of time- s effort on the trend at time  t ≥ s .29 The following result follows directly 
from (22)–(23).
PROPOSITION 6: If skills accumulate linearly, equilibrium investment,  (  a t ∗ ) t≥0 , 
and socially efficient investment  ( a t e ) t≥0 , satisfy
 g′( a t ∗ ) =  ∫ t ∞  e −r(s−t) K(s, t) ρ s ds and g′( a t e ) =  ∫ t ∞  e −r (s−t)  K(s, t ) ______r − κ  ds, t ≥ 0,  
respectively. Hence, there is underinvestment throughout the worker’s entire career.
PROOF:
Direct from integration by parts in (22)–(23).  ∎ 
29 As an example of a linear technology, consider a stationary exponential kernel  h(t ) =  η 0  e −δt and 
 K(t, s ) =  e −δ(t−s) α , for  δ, α ∈  ℝ + ; i.e.,  (  η t ) t≥0 is the solution to the ODE  η ̇t = α  a t − δ  η t ,  t ≥ 0 .  Nonstationary 
kernels can be interpreted as capturing  time-varying returns to experience, i.e.,  nonincreasing returns to experience 
arise when  K(t + h, t ) ≥ K( t ′ + h,  t ′ ) for all  t ′ > t and  h > 0. 
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Finally, observe that the baseline model is recovered when  h(t ) ≡ 0 
via a sequence  (  K n ( ⋅ , ⋅ )) n∈ℕ such that for each  t ≥ 0 ,  lim n→∞  K n ( · , t) =  lim n→∞  K n ( · , t) =  δ t ( ⋅  ) , where  δ t ( ⋅ ) is the Dirac measure at  t ≥ 0 . The reader 
interested in the properties of the distribution of wages generated by the model can 
skip directly to Section B in the Appendix.
IV. Information Structures and Policy
A strong informational assumption of the baseline model is that the demand side 
of the labor market has access to the complete time series of the worker’s perfor-
mance. While this is a reasonable approximation in industries such as academia 
(where the specifics of the output generated and its chronological appearance are 
public), it is less so in other occupations. At the other extreme are marketplaces 
in which employers enter a market platform to purchase  short-term services from 
a worker and exit it once the relationship ends. For instance, many programmers, 
developers, accountants, and even doctors and lawyers operate as independent con-
tractors (or “freelancers”) who sell  short-term labor to clients in online market-
places (e.g., upwork.com, healthgrades.com, and avvo.com). In those transactions, 
potential employers usually rely on coarser measures of past performance that are 
provided by the market platform.
The purpose of this subsection is to apply recent methods by Hörner and Lambert 
(2017) on  effort-enhacing information structures for pure career concern models 
as a policy tool to alleviate the underinvestment problem in pure human capital 
settings. Specifically, employing a specific type of information structure, I show 
how a simple adaptation of their analysis to the case of human capital accumulation 
yields incentives that are arbitrarily close to efficiency when skills exhibit enough 
persistence; interestingly, the corresponding rating system used exhibits virtually no 
persistence.
A. Labor Market and Information
Consider a market in which a worker faces a sequence of  short-term employers. 
Heuristically, at every instant  t , a  short-lived agent enters a marketplace demand-
ing the worker’s service for the period  [ t, t + dt ) . Once production  d  ξ t is real-
ized, the employer exits the market, and the same sequence of events repeats over 
[ t + dt, t + 2dt ) , now with a new employer, etc.
Upon entering the market, the time- t employer observes a  one-dimensional sta-
tistic of the worker’s past performance  Y t ∈ ℝ published by the platform. For sim-
plicity, the worker has all the bargaining power, and hence, the time- t wage takes the 
form  E  a ∗  [  θ t |  Y t ] (i.e., potential employers do not monitor changes in  ( Y t ) t≥0 ). The 
specification for  (  Y t ) t≥0 under study is
(25)  Y t =  ∫ −∞ t  e −ϕ( β ∗ +κ)(t−s) [ d  ξ s −  A s ∗ ds ] , t ≥ 0, 
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where  ϕ > 0 ,  A t ⁎ ≔  1 t≥0  ∫ 0 t  e κ(t−s)  a s ⁎ ds is the total contribution of past (equilibrium) effort choices to time- t skills, 1 is the indicator function, and 
 β ∗ ≔  √ _______  κ 2 +  σ θ 2/  σ ξ 2 + κ is the  long-run sensitivity of beliefs of the baseline 
model. In particular, when  ϕ < 1 ( > 1 ),  (  Y t ) t≥0 discounts past performance less (more) heavily than the market’s belief does asymptotically in the baseline model.30
The interpretation of (25) is one where the worker enters the market platform at 
time zero, which determines the starting point of the window over which the incen-
tives for skill acquisition are studied. Output observations before time zero are then 
interpreted as measures of performance prior to entering the marketplace that were 
collected by the platform.31
B. Stationary Exogenous Component of Skills
Recall from (3) that, in a pure  human-capital setting, the worker’s skills satisfy
(26)  θ t =  ∫ 0 t  e κ(t−s)  a s ds    A t ≔
 +  e κt  θ 0 +  ∫ 0 t  e κ(t−s)  σ θ d Z s θ   L t ≔
 =  A t +  L t , t ≥ 0. 
In this expression,  A t is the endogenous component of the worker’s time- t skills, 
which depends only on the realized history  ( ξ s : 0 ≤ s ≤ t ) . Instead,  L t is the 
exogenous component of the worker’s time- t skills, which depends only on the 
realizations of  (  Z s θ : 0 ≤ s ≤ t ) . In particular, when  κ < 0 ,  (  L t ) t≥0 follows an 
 Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process  d  L t = κ  L t dt +  σ θ d  Z t θ ,  t > 0 ,  L 0 =  θ 0 , with rate of 
mean reversion  | κ | > 0 . As Hörner and Lambert (2016) note, the environment 
becomes fully stationary when the following holds.
ASSUMPTION 1 (Stationarity of  ( L t ) t∈ℝ ):  (  L t ) t∈ℝ is a stationary centered (i.e., 
zero mean)  Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process with covariance  cov[  L t ,  L s ] =   σ θ 2 ___ 2 | κ|  e κ|t−s| , κ < 0 , defined on  ℝ .32
Under this assumption, (26) holds for all  t ≥ 0 under the additional requirement 
that  θ 0 =  L 0 is independent of  (  Z t θ ) t>0 and distributed according to   (0,  σ θ 2/ 2 | κ | ) . 
Lastly, notice that the efficiency benchmark is also given by  g′( a e ) = 1/(r − κ ) .
30 The rating (25) is the natural  human-capital counterpart of the “exponential smoothing” rating introduced 
by Hörner and Lambert (2017). While their analysis is more general (as they solve for the optional Gaussian infor-
mation structure for pure-career concerns settings), the value of the application is threefold. First, it shows how 
their methods can be translated to  pure-human capital environments. Second, it shows how information design can 
be used as a tool for economic policy. Third, it shows that the structure of ratings can depend non-trivially on the 
degree of persistence of skills, an exercise not explored in their analysis. 
31 The unbounded domain for the time variable is used to obtain a stationary investment strategy as in the long-
run analysis of the baseline model. This assumption is not critical, as the joint distribution of ( Y 0 ,  L 0 ) (with  ( L t ) t≥0 
defined in Assumption 1) can always be chosen such that the environment is stationary from time zero onward.
32 Given  (  B t ) t≥0 a Brownian motion,  (  L t ) t∈ℝ is constructed via  L t ≔   σ θ  ___  √ ___ 2 | κ|  e −| κ |t/2  B  e |κ|t  ,  t ∈ ℝ . 
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C. Optimal  ϕ > 0 and Asymptotic Efficiency as  κ ↗ 0 
Observe that given a deterministic conjecture  (  a t ∗ ) t≥0 , the process  (  Y t ) t≥0 is cen-
tered Gaussian from the market’s perspective. Thus,  E  a ∗  [  θ t |  Y t ] =  A t ∗ +  M t , where
 M t ≔  E  a ∗  [ L t |  Y t ] =  cov[  L t ,  Y t ]__________ var[  Y t ] Y t =  
cov[  L t ,  Y t ]__________ 
var[  Y t ] ∫ s≤t 
 
  e −ϕ( β ∗ +κ)(t−s) [ d  ξ s −  A s ∗ ds ], 
as  (  Y t ,  L t ) is normally distributed with zero mean. Moreover, since  (  L t ,  Y t ) t≥0 is 
stationary,  cov[  L t ,  Y t ] / var[  Y t ] turns out to be constant over time. Let
  α(ϕ) ≔  cov[  L t ,  Y t ]__________ 
var[  Y t ] , 
where the dependence on  ϕ > 0 has been made explicit.
PROPOSITION 7: The equilibrium investment policy is constant and characterized by
(27)  g′( a ∗ (ϕ)) =  α(ϕ)  ________________  (r − κ)(r + ϕ( β ∗ − κ)) , where α(ϕ) =  
ϕ  σ θ 2____________   σ ξ 2 (  β ∗ − κ − ϕκ ) . 
The optimal  ϕ > 0 is given by  ϕ ∗ (r, κ) =  √ ____ r / | κ|. Moreover, g′( a ⁎ ( ϕ ⁎ (r, κ))) 
→ 1/r as κ → 0, i.e., incentives become asymptotically efficient as κ → 0.
PROOF:
See the Appendix.  ∎ 
First, observe that if  ϕ = 1 , the equation  (  β ∗ ) 2 +  σ θ 2/ σ ξ 2 + 2κ  β ∗ = 0 (which 
follows from  β ∗ =  γ ∗ / σ ξ 2 and  γ ∗ being the steady-state variance in the baseline 
model) implies that α =  β ∗ , and thus
  g′( a ∗ (1)) =  1 ____ r − κ −  1 ________ r +  β ∗ − κ ; 
i.e., the incentives that arise in the long run of the baseline model are recovered (cf. 
Corollary 2), and thus there is underinvestment. As Hörner and Lambert note, when 
(  Y t ) t≥0 attaches the same weight to past observations as the  long-run belief that con-
ditions on the whole time series of output, the rating essentially discloses the belief 
that arises when output is public.
Interesting insights appear when studying the optimal persistence of 
(  Y t ) t≥0 as a function of the autocorrelation of skills. Specifically, using that 
 β ∗ =  √ _______  κ 2 +  σ θ 2/  σ ξ 2 + κ ,
  (  β ∗ − κ)  ϕ ∗ (r, κ) =  [r ( | κ | +   σ θ 2 _____ |κ|  σ ξ 2) ] 
1/2
 , 
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is  non-monotone in the rate of mean reversion  | κ | > 0 . In particular, 
( β ⁎ − κ) ϕ ⁎ (r, κ) → +∞ as κ → 0 , and so the rating has no persistence in the limit. 
Moreover, using that  − κ  ϕ ∗ (r, κ) =  √ ___ r | κ| ,
 α( ϕ ⁎ (r, κ)) =   ϕ ⁎ (r, κ) σ θ 2  _________________  
 σ ξ 2( β ⁎ − κ − κ ϕ ⁎ (r, κ)) → +∞ as κ → 0,
so beliefs become infinitely sensitive to changes in the rating. Importantly, by con-
tinuity of both  a ∗ ( ϕ ∗ (r, κ)) and  a e (κ) at  κ = 0 , the limit g′( a ⁎ ( ϕ ⁎ (r, κ))) → 1/r 
as κ → 0 in Proposition 7 implies that  |  a ∗ (  ϕ ∗ (r, κ)) −  a e (κ)  | < ϵ for  | κ | small; 
i.e., for any given  r > 0 , sufficiently high persistence in the  κ < 0 range (region 
in which the model is defined) leads the information structure  (  Y t ) t≥0 to generate 
incentives arbitrarily close to the corresponding efficiency level.
The intuition for the result lies on the following sensitivity-persistence  trade-off: 
a rating that discounts past information more heavily, by having lower variance, 
generates beliefs that are more responsive to its changes. The effort-maximizing 
rating then exploits the increased long-run uncertainty as κ increases (due to the 
long-run distribution of skills becomes more dispersed) to generate beliefs that have 
both high sensitivity and fast decay, and which perfectly balance each other in the 
limit. Unlike in the baseline model, however, getting close to efficiency does not 
require  r − κ to be arbitrarily small.
V. Concluding Remarks
This paper has analyzed the interplay between career concerns and the nature 
of skills, uncovering a reputationally driven mechanism that can lead to ineffi-
ciently low investments in human capital. In light of this finding, and given the role 
that human capital plays in economic growth, examining policies that incentivize 
skill acquisition acquires relevance. Promising areas include the optimal design of 
 information structures and compensation schemes that account for actions having a 
 long-term impact on output variables via skill acquisition.33
Regarding the assumptions of the model, the additive separability of the pro-
duction function plays an important role by eliminating incentives for strategically 
affecting the speed of everyone’s learning (i.e., experimentation). Importantly, 
this modeling device is convenient if the goal is to understand how reputational 
incentives vary over workers’ career due to informational considerations, provided 
uncertainty about ability monotonically decays with tenure in the labor market to a 
first-order approximation.
Second, while the Gaussian structure adds considerable tractability, the main 
forces found in this paper are likely to arise under other specifications of the 
 randomness present in the environment. In particular, the incentives for effort provi-
sion (either as a direct production or skills input) are weaker when beliefs become 
33 Preliminary work in the area of optimal contracting includes Kwon (2006) and Prat (2015) in specific envi-
ronments, and the more general approach of Sannikov (2014). 
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less sensitive to new information, as the impact that effort has on wages is then 
diminished. Similarly, the underinvestment result is the consequence of a more 
fundamental identification problem that will be present under other distributional 
assumptions.
Finally, the assumption that the demand side of the labor market is perfectly com-
petitive leads to wages that are linear in the market’s belief, which is critical for the 
existence of deterministic equilibria. In particular, labor supply, understood as effort 
provision, is completely inelastic at all points in time, and the covariance struc-
ture of wages is unaffected by the workers’ equilibrium actions. As is well-known, 
however, labor market imperfections can lead to wage compression (Acemoglu and 
Pischke 1999), which can be modeled as wages that are a nonlinear function of the 
market’s expectation of  next-period production. Such nonlinearity would lead to 
incentives that explicitly depend on the posterior mean of the skill distribution. As 
a result, controlling for tenure, the supply of labor would depend  non-trivially on 
wages, and the covariance structure of the latter would be endogenous. This and 
other questions are left for future research.
Appendix
A. Proofs
PROOFS OF PROPOSITIONS 1 AND 4:
They follow directly from  point-wise optimization in (22) when  λ = 1 and 
λ = 0 , respectively.  ∎ 
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2: 
To show that  μ t =  β t  ∫ t∞  e − ∫ ts (r+ β t −κ)du ds decreases over time, observe first that
  
d log (  μ t ) ________
dt
 =   γ ̇t  __ γ t + r +  
 γ t  ___  σ ξ 2 − κ −  
1 _______________  ∫ t∞  e − ∫ ts (r+ γ u / σ ξ 2−κ)du ds
. 
If  γ t >  γ ∗ , then
  ∫ 
t
∞  e − ∫ ts (r+ γ u / σ ξ 2−κ)du ds <  1 __________ 
r +  γ ∗ / σ ξ 2 − κ  ⇒   
d log (  μ t ) ________
dt
 <   γ ̇t  __ γ t +  
 γ t  ___  σ ξ 2 −  
 γ ∗  ___ σ ξ 2 . 
Finally, from the ODE that governs  γ t ,  γ ̇t / γ t +  γ t / σ ξ 2 = 2κ +  σ θ 2/ γ t , so
  
d log (  μ t ) ________
dt
 < 2κ +   σ θ 2 ___ γ t  −  
 γ ∗  ___ σ ξ 2 < 2κ +  
 σ θ 2 ___ γ ∗ −  
 γ ∗  ___ σ ξ 2 = 0 
by definition of  γ ∗ . The result follows from  γ t >  γ ∗ being equivalent to  γ ̇t < 0 .
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Finally, note that when  κ ∈ (−∞, r ) ,
    sign  ∂ ___ ∂ κ(  √ 
_______  κ 2 +  σ θ 2/  σ ξ 2 + κ  ___________ √ _______  κ 2 +  σ θ 2/  σ ξ 2 + r) 
     = sign  [ ( √ _______  κ 2 +  σ θ 2/  σ ξ 2 + κ)  ( √ _______  κ 2 +  σ θ 2/  σ ξ 2 + r − κ) ] > 0, 
i.e., the long-run level of effort increases with  κ .  ∎ 
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 3: 
Note that since  σ θ > 0 ,  γ ∗ (κ) defined in (13) is strictly positive for all  κ ∈ ℝ . 
Let  (  ν t ) t≥0 denote the solution to the ordinary differential equation  ν ̇t = 2r  ν t + 
σ θ 2 −  ν t 2 /  σ ξ 2 with initial condition  ν 0 =  γ 0 >  γ ∗ (r) ≔  σ ξ 2 (  √ _______  r 2 +  σ θ 2/  σ ξ 2 + r ) . It is 
easy to see that  (  ν t ) t≥0 is strictly decreasing, and that it converges to  γ ∗ (r ) .
Define the function
  μ ̃t =   ν t  ___  σ ξ 2  ∫ t
∞  e − ∫ ts ν u / σ ξ 2du ds, t ≥ 0 .
It is straightforward to see that the proof of Proposition 2 still goes through if 
 κ = r . Thus,  (  μ ̃t ) t≥0 is strictly decreasing. Also, because  (  ν t ) t≥0 converges,  (  μ ̃t ) t≥0 
converges to 1. As a result,  μ ̃t > 1 for all  t > 0 . It remains to show that, for a fixed γ 0 >  γ ∗ (r ) , equilibrium effort,  ( a t ∗ (κ;  γ 0 )) t≥0 , converges point-wise to  (  μ ̃t ) t≥0 
from below when  κ ↗ r .
It is easy to verify that the solution to the ODE (7) is given by
  γ t (κ;  γ 0 ) =  b − ca e qt _______1 − c e qt   ,
where
 a ≔  σ ξ 2  (κ +  √ _______  κ 2 +  σ θ 2/ σ ξ 2 ) > 0 and b ≔  σ ξ 2  (κ −  √ _______  κ 2 +  σ θ 2/ σ ξ 2 ) < 0 
(i.e.,  a and  − b are the roots of  2κx +  σ θ 2 −  x 2 / σ ξ 2 ), and where
  q ≔  a − b ____ σ ξ 2 and c ≔  
 γ 0 − b ____ γ 0 − a  
(cf. example 6.2.13 in Øksendal 2013).
By definition of  (  ν t ) t≥0 ,  γ t (r;  γ 0 ) =  ν t . Also, observe that since  γ ∗ (κ ) is increas-
ing in  κ , we have that  γ 0 >  γ ∗ (r ) implies that  t ↦  γ t (κ;  γ 0 ) is strictly decreasing 
for all  κ ∈ (−∞, r ) .
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It is clear that  γ t (κ;  γ 0 ) →  ν t when κ → r , as  c, a, b , and  q are all continuous 
in  κ at  κ = r . Moreover,  γ t (κ;  γ 0 ) ∈ [ 0,  γ 0 ] for all  κ ∈ ℝ and  t ≥ 0 . By the 
Dominated Convergence Theorem (DCT), for every fixed  s ≥ t ,
  ∫ 
t
 
s
 (r +  γ u (κ;  γ 0 )/ σ ξ 2 − κ) du  →  ∫ t s (r +  ν u / σ ξ 2 − r) du
when κ → r , and hence, by continuity,
  f κ (s; t,  γ 0 ) ≔  e − ∫ ts (r+ γ u (κ;  γ 0 )/ σ ξ 2−κ)du →  e − ∫ ts  ν u / σ ξ 2 du , as κ → r. 
Now, observe that since  r ≥ κ and  t ↦  γ t (κ;  γ 0 ) is strictly decreasing, we have 
that
  f κ (s; t,  γ 0 ) ≤  e − ∫ ts γ u (κ;  γ 0 )/ σ ξ 2 du ≤  e − γ ∗ (κ;  γ 0 )(s−t)/ σ ξ 2 , s ≥ t. 
As a result, given  
_ κ < r , we deduce that for all  κ ∈ [ _ κ, r ] and  s ≥ t ,
  f κ (s; t,  γ 0 ) ≤  e − γ ∗ ( _ κ;  γ 0 )(s−t)/ σ ξ 2 ≔  g  κ ̅ (s; t,  γ 0 ) ,
as  γ ∗ (κ;  γ 0 ) is increasing in  κ . Moreover,  g  κ ̅ (s; t,  γ 0 ) ∈  L 1 ( [ t, ∞); ℝ ) due to 
 γ ∗ ( _ κ;  γ 0 ) > 0 . The DCT allows us then to conclude that
  ∫ 
t
 
∞
 f κ (s; t,  γ 0 ) ds →  ∫ t ∞ e − ∫ ts  ν u / σ ξ 2 du ds. 
The result then follows from the continuity of  κ ↦  γ t (κ;  γ 0 ) at  κ = r noticing that
  a t ∗ (κ;  γ 0 ) =   γ t 
∗ (κ;  γ 0 ) ________ σ ξ 2  ∫ t
∞  f κ (s; t,  γ 0 ) ds.  ∎ 
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 5: 
Suppose that the market conjectures that the worker will follow a deterministic 
strategy  a ∗ ≔  (  a t ∗ ) t≥0 . Since wages take the form  w t = λ  a t ∗ +  p t ∗ , only  (  p t ∗ ) t≥0 
matters for incentives.
The solution to (6) as a function of the public history is
(A1)  p t ∗ =  e − ∫ 0 t( β s −κ)ds  p 0 +  ∫ 0 t  e − ∫ st ( β u −κ)du [  η s (  a ∗s )ds +  β s (d  ξ s − λ  a s ∗ ds )] , 
where  β t =  γ t /  σ ξ 2 for all  t ≥ 0 . Also, because  (  η t ( ⋅ )) t≥0 is deterministic, the con-
jectured trajectory  (  η t (  a ∗t )) , is fixed at time zero and unaffected by the worker’s 
effort choice. Thus, the only component of the public belief that can be affected by 
the worker’s actions is
(A2)  Y t ≔  ∫ 0 t  e − ∫ st ( β u −κ)du  β s  d ξ s =  ∫ 0 t  e − ∫ st ( β u −κ)du  β s [(  p s + λ  a s )ds +  σ ξ d  Z s ], 
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where in the last equality I used that  d  ξ t = (  p t +  a t )dt +  σ ξ d  Z t from the worker’s 
perspective.
Similarly, it is easy to see that the worker’s belief about his own skills satisfies
(A3)  p t =  e − ∫ 0 tκ ds  p 0 +  ∫ 0 t  e κ(t−s)du [  η s (  a s )ds +  β s  σ ξ d  Z s ], 
where  Z ≔  (  Z t ) t≥0 is a Brownian motion from the worker’s standpoint. Inserting 
this into (A2) yields
 Y t  =  ∫ 0 t  e − ∫ st ( β u −κ)du  β s [ e κs  p 0 +  ∫ 0 s  e κ(s−u) ( η u ( a u )du +  β u  σ ξ d Z u ) + λ a s ds +  σ ξ d Z s ] . 
Since the first term in  Y t is unaffected by the effort decision, the worker’s optimiza-
tion problem is reduced to maximizing
 E [ ∫ 0 ∞ e −rt ( ∫ 0 t e − ∫ st ( β u −κ)du β s 
× { ∫ 0 s e κ(s−u) ( η u ( a u )du +  β u  σ ξ d Z u ) + λ  a s ds +  σ ξ d Z s } − g(  a t )) dt] . 
The following lemma is a direct consequence of  r > κ , and its proof deferred 
to the end.
LEMMA 2 (Stochastic Integrals Vanish): When  r > κ ,
  J ≔ E [ ∫ 0 ∞  e −rt { ∫ 0 t  e − ∫ st ( β u −κ)du  β s ( ∫ 0 s  e κ(s−u)  β u  σ ξ d  Z u ) ds} dt] 
 = E [ ∫ 0 ∞  e −rt ( ∫ 0 t  e − ∫ st ( β u −κ)du  β s d  Z s ) dt] = 0. 
With this in hand, the problem of the worker is reduced to
  max 
a∈ 
  E [ ∫ 0 ∞  e −rt ( ∫ 0 t  e − ∫ st ( β u −κ)du  β s { ∫ 0 s  e κ(s−u)  η u (  a u )du +  a s ds} − g(  a t )) dt] . 
Using integration by parts,
    ∫ 
0
 t  e − ∫ st ( β u −κ)du  β s  ∫ 0 s  e κ(s−u)  η u (  a u ) du
     =  e κt  ∫ 
0
 t  e −κs  η s (  a s ) ds −  e − ∫ 0 t( β s −κ)ds  ∫ 0 t  e  ∫ 0 s ( β u −κ)du  η s (  a s ) ds. 
Thus, the worker’s objective function has three integrals of the form (up to multipli-
cative constants)
  I ≔  ∫ 
0
 ∞  e −rt [ e − ∫ 0 tτ s ds  ∫ 0 t  e  ∫ 0 s τ u du  ν s ] dt ,
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where  τ t =  β t − κ or − κ , and  ν t = λ  β t  a t or  η t (  a t ) . Since in any case  r + τ > 0 , 
a direct application of Fubini’s theorem implies that
  I =  ∫ 
0
 ∞  e  ∫ 0 tτ t dt  ν t  ∫ t ∞  e − ∫ 0 s (r+ τ u )du dsdt =  ∫ 0 ∞  e −rt  ν t  ∫ t ∞  e − ∫ ts (r+ τ u )du dsdt .
Defining  ρ t ≔ 1 / (r − κ )  −  μ t /  β t where  μ t ≔  β t  ∫ t ∞  e − ∫ ts (r+ β u −κ)du ds , we con-
clude that the objective becomes
(A4)  E [ ∫ 0 ∞  e −rt (λ  μ t  a t +  ρ t  η t (  a t ) − g(  a t )) dt] . 
To prove the statement of Proposition 5, suppose first that  (  a t ∗ ) t≥0 is a determin-
istic equilibrium. Then,  (  a t ∗ ) t≥0 must maximize (A4). But this implies that  (  a t ∗ ) t≥0 
must solve (22), i.e.,  max a∈    ∫ 0 ∞  e −rt (λ  μ t  a t +  ρ t  η t (  a t ) − g(  a t )) dt , because other-
wise the worker could improve his payoff.
To prove the converse, suppose that  (  a t ∗ ) t≥0 is not a deterministic equilibrium; 
in particular, when the market forms beliefs using this strategy, there is a deviation 
(  a ̂t ) t≥0 that is progressively measurable with respect to  (  ξ t ) t≥0 , such that
   E  a ̂ [ ∫ 0 ∞ e −rt (λ  μ t  a ̂t +  ρ t  η t ( a ̂ t ) − g( a ̂t )) dt] 
    >  ∫ 
0
 ∞  e −rt (λ  μ t  a t ∗ +  ρ t  η t ( a ∗t ) − g(  a t ∗ )) dt ,
where  E  a ̂ [ ⋅ ] reflects that the expectation is taken across all possible realizations 
of  (  ξ t ) t≥0 according to the measure induced by  (  a ̂t ) t≥0 on the set of continuous 
 functions from  ℝ + to  ℝ . But in this case, there must exist a set of  nonzero measure 
of paths of  (  ξ t ) t≥0 over which
  ∫ 
0
 ∞  e −rt (λ  μ t  a ̂t (  ξ t ) +  ρ t  η t (  a ̂ t (  ξ t )) − g(  a ̂t ( ξ t ))) dt 
  >  ∫ 
0
 ∞  e −rt (λ  μ t  a t ∗ +  ρ t  η t (  a ∗t ) − g(  a t ∗ )) dt. 
Fixing any path  {  ξ ̃ t : t ≥ 0} in that set, let  t ↦  a ̃t =  a ̂t (  ξ ̃ t ) , which is a (measur-
able) function of time only. Thus,  (  a t ∗ ) t≥0 does not solve (22), from where the con-
clusion follows.
To conclude, the proof of Lemma 2 follows. Rearranging terms in  J ,
  J = E [ ∫ 0 ∞  e −(r−κ)t { ∫ 0 t  e − ∫ st β u du  β s ( ∫ 0 s  e −κu  β u  σ ξ d  Z u ) ds} dt] . 
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Now,
      ∫ 
0
 t  e − ∫ st β u du  β s E [ |  ∫ 0 s  e −κu  β u  σ ξ d  Z u | ] ds   J ̂t 
       ≤   ∫ 
0
 t  e − ∫ st β u du  β s  (E [ ( ∫ 0 s  e −κu  β u  σ ξ d Z u ) 2 ] ) 
1/2
 ds
       =   ∫ 
0
 t  e − ∫ st β u du  β s  ( ∫ 0 s  e −2κu  β u 2  σ ξ 2 du) 1/2 ds,  
where the last equality follows from  ∫ 0 s  e −κu  β u  σ ξ d  Z u ∼  (0,  ∫ 0 s  e −2κu  (  β u  σ ξ ) 2 du ) . 
Using that  (  β t ) t≥0 is bounded, there is  C > 0 such that
(A5)  J ˆt ≤ C  ∫ 0 t  (1 −  e −2κs ) 1/2 ds ≤ Ct < +∞. 
By Fubini’s theorem (Theorem 18.3 in Billingsley 1995),
(A6)     E [ ∫ 0 t  e − ∫ st β u du  β s ( ∫ 0 s  e −κu  β u  σ ξ d Z u ) ds] 
   =  ∫ 
0
 t  e − ∫ st β u du  β s  E [ ∫ 0 s  e −κu  β u  σ ξ d Z u ]  = 0 ds = 0.
 Thus, it remains to show that the first two integrals in  J can be interchanged, i.e., that
(A7)   J =  ∫ 
0
 ∞ E [ e −(r−κ)t  ∫ 0 t  e − ∫ st β u du  β s ( ∫ 0 s  e −κu  β u  σ ξ d Z u ) ds] dt, 
as  J = 0 would then follow from (A6). To this end, observe that
(A8)   K 0 ≔   ∫ 0 ∞ E [ |  e −(r−κ)t  ∫ 0 t  e − ∫ st β u du  β s ( ∫ 0 s  e −κu  β u  σ ξ d Z u ) ds| ] dt
 ≤   ∫ 
0
 ∞ E [ e −(r−κ)t  ∫ 0 t  e − ∫ st β u du  β s  |  ∫ 0 s  e −κu  β u  σ ξ d Z u | ds] dt
 =   ∫ 
0
 ∞  e −(r−κ)t  ∫ 
0
 t  e − ∫ st β u du  β s E [ | ∫ 0 s  e −κu  β u  σ ξ d Z u | ds]  =  J t 
 dt, 
where the last equality follows from Tonelli’s theorem. Using that  J ˆt ≤ Ct and 
r > κ , it follows that  K 0 < ∞ , and hence, from Fubini’s theorem, (A7) holds. 
Finally, that the other expectation is also zero follows from identical arguments. 
This concludes the proof.  ∎ 
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PROOF OF PROPOSITION 7: 
Observe first that
  cov[  L t ,  Y t ] =  ∫ s≤t    e −ϕ( β ∗ −κ)(t−s) cov[  L t ,  L s ] ds. 
But  cov[  L t ,  L s ] = − σ θ 2  e κ|t−s| /2κ for a stationary  Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process (recall that  κ < 0 ), which yields
  cov[  L t ,  Y t ] = −  σ θ 
2______________ 
2κ [ ϕ(  β ∗ − κ )  − κ ] . 
Now, by independence
   var[  Y t ] =  var [  ∫ s≤t    e −ϕ( β ∗ −κ)(t−s)  L s ds]   
V ≔
 +  var  [ ∫ s≤t    e −ϕ( β ∗ −κ)(t−s)  σ ξ d Z t ξ ]  
=   σ ξ 2 _______ 
2ϕ( β ∗ −κ)
 .
However,
V =  ∫ 
s≤t 
 
  e −ϕ( β ⁎ −κ)(t−s)  ∫ 
u≤t 
 
  e −ϕ( β ⁎ −κ)(t−u) cov[ L s ,  L u ] du ds
 = −  σ θ 2 ___
2κ  ∫ 0∞  e −ϕ( β ⁎ −κ)t  [ ∫ 0 t  e −ϕ( β ⁎ −κ)s  e κ(t−s) ds +  ∫ t ∞  e −ϕ( β ⁎ −κ)s  e κ(s−t) ds] dt
 = −  σ θ 2 ___
2κ  [ 1  ____________________________   [ϕ( β ⁎ − κ) + κ][ϕ( β ⁎ − κ) − κ] −  1  ________________________   2ϕ( β ⁎ − κ)[ϕ( β ⁎ − κ) + κ]
 +  1  ________________________   
2ϕ( β ⁎ − κ)[ϕ( β ⁎ − κ) − κ]] 
 = −  σ θ 2 ___
2κ  
2ϕ( β ⁎ − κ) − [ϕ( β ⁎ − κ) − κ] + [ϕ( β ⁎ − κ) + κ] _____________________________________
2ϕ( β ⁎ − κ)[ϕ( β ⁎ − κ) − κ][ϕ( β ⁎ − κ) + κ] 
 = −  σ θ 2 ___
2κ  
2[ϕ( β ⁎ − κ) + κ]  ________________________________  
2ϕ( β ⁎ − κ)[ϕ( β ⁎ − κ) − κ][ϕ( β ⁎ − κ) + κ]
 = −  σ θ 2  _________________________   
2κϕ( β ⁎ − κ)[ϕ( β ⁎ − κ) − κ].
So,
  var[  Y t ] =  1 _________ 2ϕ( β ∗ − κ)[ σ ξ 2 −   σ θ 
2_____________  κ[ϕ( β ∗ − κ) − κ ]] .
VOL. 10 NO. 2 185CISTERNAS: CAREER CONCERNS AND THE NATURE OF SKILLS
Using that  σ θ 2 =  σ ξ 2 [  (  β ∗ − κ ) 2 −  κ 2 ] ,
  var[  Y t ] =    σ ξ 
2
 _________  
2ϕ(  β ∗ − κ )[ κϕ(  β 
∗ − κ )  −  κ 2 −  (  β ∗ − κ ) 2 +  κ 2     ________________________κ [ ϕ(  β ∗ − κ )  − κ ] ] 
 =   σ ξ 
2
 ____ 
2κϕ  
ϕκ −  β ∗ + κ  __________ϕ( β ∗ − κ) − κ 
 ⇒ α =   cov[  Y t ,  L t ]__________ 
var[  Y t ] =  
 σ θ 2ϕ ____________   σ ξ 2 [  β ∗ − κ − ϕκ ] > 0. 
Regarding incentives, note that, from the perspective of the worker,
 E [ ∫ 0 ∞  e −rt  M t  dt] = E [ ∫ 0 ∞  e −rt α ( ∫ s≤t 
 
  e −ϕ( β ∗ −κ)(t−s) [ d  ξ s −  A s ∗ ds ]) dt] 
  = E [ ∫ 0 ∞ e −rt α ( ∫ s≤t 
 
  e −ϕ( β ∗ −κ)(t−s) [  A s + E[  L s |   s ] −  A s ∗ ] ds) dt] , 
where  (E[  L s |   s ] ) s≥0 is exogenous and   t is, as in the baseline model, the  σ -algebra 
generated by  (  ξ s ) s≤t . Thus, from the point of view of incentives, the only relevant 
part to consider is
(A9)  I ≔ E [ ∫ 0 ∞  e −rt α ( ∫ 0 t  e −ϕ( β ∗ −κ)(t−s) { ∫ 0 s  e κ(s−u)  a u du} ds) dt] 
as the worker’s investment problem starts at time zero (which modifies  ∫ s≤t   to  ∫ 0 t ). 
Now,
 I = E [ ∫ 0 ∞  e −[r+ϕ( β ∗ −κ)]t α ( ∫ 0 t  e [ϕ( β ∗ −κ)+κ]s { ∫ 0 s  e −κu  a u du} ds) dt] 
  = E [ ∫ 0 ∞  e −[r+ϕ( β ∗ −κ)]t  α __________ ϕ(  β ∗ − κ )  + κ( e [ϕ( β ∗ −κ)+κ]t  ∫ 0 t  e −κs  a s ds −  ∫ 0 t  e ϕ( β ∗ −κ)s  a s ds) dt] 
  = E [ ∫ 0 ∞  e −rt  α  a s __________  ϕ(  β ∗ − κ )  + κ( ∫ t ∞  e −(r−κ)(s−t) ds −  ∫ 0 t  e −[r+ϕ( β ∗ −κ)](s−t) ds) dt] 
  = E [ ∫ 0 ∞  e −rt α  a s  1  ________________   (r − κ )(r + ϕ(  β ∗ − κ ))  dt] ,
which implies that the optimal investment policy is stationary according to
  g′( a ∗ ) =  α  ________________   (r − κ)(r + ϕ( β ∗ − κ)).
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To find the optimal  ϕ ∗ , observe that  α = α(ϕ) =  σ θ 2ϕ /  σ ξ 2 [  β ∗ − κ − ϕκ ] yields
  d ___ 
dϕ( α  ________________   (r − κ)(r + ϕ( β ∗ − κ))) = 0
⇔  σ θ 2[ β ∗ − κ − ϕκ][r + ϕ( β ∗ − κ)] −  σ θ 2ϕ {( β ∗ − κ)[ β ∗ − κ − κϕ] − κ[r + ϕ( β ∗ − κ)]} = 0
 ⇔ (  β ∗ − κ )[ r + ϕ(  β ∗ − κ ) ] − ϕ(  β ∗ − κ )[  β ∗ − κ − κϕ ] = 0
 ⇒  ϕ ∗ =   √ ___ r ___|κ| .
This is clearly a maximum, as
  d ___ 
dϕ( α(ϕ)  ________________  (r − κ)(r + ϕ( β ∗ − κ))) =   σ θ 
2( β ∗ − κ)[r +  ϕ 2 κ ]   __________________   (r − κ)[(r + ϕ( β ∗ − κ))] 2 > 0 
if and only if ϕ <  ϕ ∗ . 
Finally,
 g′( a ∗ (κ)) =   α  _________________   (r − κ)(r +  ϕ ∗ ( β ⁎ − κ))
 =   1 _____ (r − κ)  
 σ θ 2______________  σ ξ 2 ( β ∗ − κ −  ϕ ∗ κ)  
 ϕ ∗ _____________  (r +  ϕ ∗ ( β ∗ − κ))
 =   1 _____ (r − κ)  
 σ θ 2  ________________    σ ξ 2 ( √   κ 2 +  σ θ 2/ σ ξ 2 +  √ ___ r | κ| )  
 √ _ r _______________   (r  √ __ |κ| +  √ _ r  √ __  κ 2 +  σ θ 2/ σ ξ 2 ) ↗  
1 __r , 
as  κ ↗ 0 , concluding the proof.  ∎ 
B. Wages
This Appendix establishes the properties of the distribution of wages generated 
by the general model of Section III. In particular, human-capital accumulation in 
conjunction with learning are able to replicate two well documented empirical reg-
ularities of the time series of wages. First, average wages (or earnings) tend to be 
increasing and concave over the life cycle (e.g., Becker 1975, ch. VII). Second, the 
dispersion of wages within cohorts tends to increase with experience (Neal and 
Rosen 2000).34
34 Two models that deliver profiles of earnings with properties that are similar to the ones previously men-
tioned are  Ben-Porath (1964) and Jovanovic (1979). In the first model, productivity is observable and the worker 
invests in skills. As in the model I examine, average wages increase with experience due to human capital accu-
mulating over time. Wage dispersion that increases with cohort experience instead arises from heterogeneity in the 
 skill-accumulation technology. In Jovanovic’s model, skills are exogenous and hidden. In addition, he allows for 
turnover, and hence experience and tenure do not coincide. As in the current model, wage dispersion that increases 
with cohort experience results from learning. The model instead predicts that average wages increase with tenure, 
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PROPOSITION 8 (Distribution of Wages): In the general model defined by (1), 
(21), and  λ ∈ [ 0, 1 ] , the wage process is Gaussian with mean and covariance
(A10)  E[  w t ] = λ  a t ∗ +  e κt  p 0 +  ∫ 0 t  e κ(t−s)  η s (  a ∗s ) ds, t ≥ 0,  and
(A11)  cov( w t ,  w s ) =  e κ(t+s)  ∫ 0 s  e −2κu   γ u 2 __ σ ξ 2  du, t ≥ s. 
In particular,  var( w t ) is increasing over time.
Because the model under study allows for learning, equilibrium wages are perfectly 
aligned with the second empirical regularity: since the market gradually  distinguishes 
between workers who have suffered good and bad shocks, wages becomes more 
dispersed over time as workers are rewarded based on their past performance.
To see how the model can generate the first regularity, consider the baseline 
specification  η t (  a t ) = (1 − λ )  a t , in its pure human capital version ( λ = 0 ), with 
skills evolving as a martingale in the absence of effort ( κ = 0 ). If information 
accumulates over time, therefore,
  
dE[  w t ] ______
dt
 =  a t ∗ > 0 and   d 
2 E[  w t ] _______
d t 2  =  
d a t ∗  ____
dt
 < 0. 
By continuity, the same conclusion holds in a neighborhood of  (λ, κ )  = (0, 0) .
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 8: 
The expressions for  E[  w t ] and  cov( w t ,  w s ) follow directly from: (i)  w t = λ  a t ∗ + 
p t ∗ ; (ii)  (  p t ∗ ) t≥0 satisfying
  p t ∗ =  e κt  p 0 +  ∫ 0 t  e κ(t−s)  η s (  a ∗s ) ds +  ∫ 0 t  e κ(t−s)   γ s  __ σ ξ  d Z s , t ≥ 0, 
from a  time-zero perspective; (iii)  E [ ∫ 0 t  e κ(t−s)  γ s / σ ξ d Z s ] = 0 ,  t ≥ 0 , in equilib-
rium; and from (iv)
 cov ( ∫ 0 t  e κ(t−u)   γ u  __ σ ξ  d Z u ,  ∫ 0 s  e κ(s−u)   γ u  __ σ ξ d Z u ) =   e κt  e κs V ( ∫ 0 s  e −κu   γ u  __ σ ξ d Z u ) 
 =  e κ(t+s)  ∫ 
0
 s  ( e −κs   γ u  __ σ ξ ) 
2 du,  t ≥ s,  
as matches that survive longer are precisely the highly productive ones. Moreover, once controlling for tenure, 
there are no returns to experience. Recently, Bonatti and Hörner (2017) have also made progress in this respect by 
showing that complementarities and coarse information structures can lead to wages that are single peaked, a fea-
ture documented by Baker, Gibbs, and Holmström (1994) who analyzed data on wages coming from a single firm. 
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where the first equality is due to the independent increments of  ( Z t ∗ ) t≥0 , and the 
second follows from the stochastic integral being of the Ito type.
To conclude, it is immediate that  t ↦ var[  w t ] is increasing when  κ ≥ 0 . If κ < 0 , using that  (  γ t ) t≥0 is decreasing we deduce
 
d var[  w t ] ________
dt
 = 2κ  e 2κt  ∫ 
0
 t  e −2κs   γ s 2 ___ σ ξ 2  ds +  
 γ t 2  ___ σ ξ 2 > 2κ  e 
2κt   γ t 2  ___ σ ξ 2  ∫ 0 
t  e −2κs ds +   γ t 2  ___ σ ξ 2 =  
 e 2κt  γ t 2  _____ σ ξ 2 > 0.  ∎ 
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